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ABSTRACT
In this Article, I revisit the concept of universal jurisdiction in making a
case for the application of mitigated universal jurisdiction in general and in
the Syrian civil war case in particular, through the jurisdiction of sovereign
states and their national courts. I argue that the international community will
sooner or later demand that the perpetrators of the heinous war crimes and
crimes against humanity be held accountable. However, since the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will probably be impeded by the
United Nations Security Council’s veto, the international community might use
another trajectory for prosecuting the perpetrators of the alleged crimes. One
possibility is to rely on the principle of universal jurisdiction, in its mitigated
form, according to which Syrian leaders can be prosecuted under the
jurisdictions of foreign states.
I claim that mitigated universal jurisdiction, dependent mainly on its
subordination to the principle of complementarity (also referred to as
“subsidiarity” in the national legislation of some states), is still the best legal
tool for doing ex-post facto justice with perpetrators of international core
crimes in general and in the Syrian case in particular. This conclusion results
from an analysis of Syrian society in Part IV, which reveals that the chances
are high that post-conflict Syrian society would have great difficulty
undertaking the legal trials of perpetrators of international core crimes in
good faith. Therefore, universal jurisdiction could serve as a practical tool for
prosecuting those perpetrators of crimes in other states.
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INTRODUCTION
Since March 2011, Syria has been experiencing a devastating civil war,1
which began as civil demonstrations for a democratic and liberal Syria2 and
deteriorated into a bloody armed conflict.3 During this conflict, numerous war
crimes and crimes against humanity have been perpetrated by both the
regime’s army (mainly the shabbiha, the Syrian security forces) and the troops
of the various rebel groups.4 The crimes include murder, torture, violence
against civilians, and even the use of chemical weapons.5 Sooner or later, the
international community will demand that the perpetrators of these crimes be
held accountable; however, an initiative to try President al-Assad at the
International Criminal Court (ICC) was vetoed by Russia and China in the
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council.6 It seems, then, that the international
community might use another trajectory for prosecuting the perpetrators of the
alleged crimes. One possibility is to rely on the principle of universal
jurisdiction, according to which Syrian leaders7 can be prosecuted under the
jurisdictions of foreign states. This principle would also work to pressure postwar Syrian society into prosecuting those responsible for committing
international core crimes in its own courts—because if Syria fails to do so, it
knows that other states will.8

1 Also referred to as “the Syrian uprising,” “the Syrian rebellion,” and in legal terms, a non-international
armed conflict. In this Article it will be referred to as “the uprising” or “the war.”
2 See FOUAD AJAMI, THE SYRIAN REBELLION xv (2012); Salwa Ismail, The Syrian Uprising: Imagining
and Performing the Nation, 11 STUD. ETHNICITY & NATIONALISM 538, 539 (2011); Emma Lungren-Jörum,
Discourse of a Revolution: Framing the Syrian Uprising, 3 ORTAGOĞU ETÜTLERI 9, 11 (2012).
3 Numerous reports of bodies of the United Nations appointed to investigate human rights violations in
Syria review this deterioration. See, e.g., United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of
Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Rep. on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta
Area of Damascus, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553 (2013) [hereinafter Ghouta Report]; Human Rights
Council, Report of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50
(Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Indep. Int’l Comm’n Syrian Report 2012]; Human Rights Council, Report of the
Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014)
[hereinafter Indep. Int’l Comm’n Syrian Report 2014].
4 Indep. Int’l Comm’n Syrian Report 2012, supra note 3, at 16.
5 Ghouta Report, supra note 3, at 2–3.
6 Rep. of the S.C., at 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/68/663 (2014).
7 I refer here both to those serving in President Al-Assad’s regime and to those responsible for
international crimes among the dissident armed groups in Syria.
8 This claim in particular and the overall analysis made in this Article in general rest on the assumption
that the conflict will not render a complete dissolution of the Syrian state. Nevertheless, it is of course possible
that the current developments on the ground, such as the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, will render changes in the political order or even dissolution of the Syrian state. For arguments
supporting the assumption that Syria will not dissolve, see AJAMI, supra note 2, at 184–87.
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In this Article, I revisit the concept of universal jurisdiction in making a
case for the application of mitigated universal jurisdiction through the
jurisdiction of sovereign states and their national courts.9 I claim that mitigated
universal jurisdiction, dependent mainly on its subordination to the principle of
complementarity (also referred to as “subsidiarity” in the national legislation of
some states), is still the best legal tool for doing ex-post facto justice with
perpetrators of international core crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity—and apply my conclusions to the Syrian case.
Following this introduction, in Part I, I present and analyze the concept of
mitigated universal jurisdiction. After a brief review of the rationale of
universal jurisdiction, I focus on the justifications for its mitigated version. I
claim that this concept has been accepted by the ICC and states that have
incorporated universal jurisdiction into their national legislation because, as
numerous scholars have argued, it addresses several interests: on the one hand,
it prevents impunity and ensures due process of law; on the other, it secures the
interests of reformed societies in their transition to democracy. It also serves to
protect the rights of the accused and prevent their persecution by their own
nation states, provided that the preconditioning of universal jurisdiction on the
principle of subsidiarity is in itself limited by several parameters that ensure
the legal procedure is executed in good faith.
In Part II, I explain why the concept of universal jurisdiction applied by the
national courts, and not only by the ICC, is still relevant. I focus on situations
in which the ICC cannot or would not interfere, and suggest that in these cases
universal jurisdiction may be applicable by the national courts of sovereign
states.
In Part III, due to the fact that both the ICC and national courts consider
themselves “courts of second resort,” I discuss in depth the principle of
complementarity, which serves as the cornerstone for the application of
mitigated universal jurisdiction. I first examine this principle’s development
under the ICC’s jurisdiction, as this principle was first formed by the Rome
Statute and applied and interpreted by this court. Then, I review the principle’s
application and interpretation in national courts, where it is mostly referred to
as the principle of subsidiarity.10

9

This is true regardless of its possible application by the ICC or other international courts or tribunals.
In Part III, I argue that the terms “complementarity’” and “subsidiarity” may be used interchangeably.
I also explain in this Part why I prefer to use “complementarity.” However, because “subsidiarity” is the term
10
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In Part IV, I discuss the Syrian case. First, I provide a historical
background of Syrian society, beginning with the establishment of the Syrian
state through the French Mandate and continuing through the development of
the Syrian state to the eruption of the 2011 uprising. I will focus here on the
different sectarian, regional, and tribal loyalties within this society. By
contrasting the cohesion of Syrian society with its factionalism, I will assess
the potential ability and willingness of the Syrian society to conduct trials of
war crime perpetrators in Syria. In this way, I examine the possible
ramifications of this Article’s analysis for the Syrian case. I argue that given
the specific circumstances in Syria, the chances are high that post-conflict
Syrian society would have great difficulty undertaking the legal trials of
perpetrators of international core crimes in good faith. Therefore, universal
jurisdiction could serve as a practical tool for prosecuting those perpetrators of
crimes in other states. In the final section I present my conclusions.
I. MITIGATED UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
While the concept of universal jurisdiction is controversial, as will be
shown in the following subsection, the concept of universal jurisdiction
mitigated by the principle of complementarity (subsidiarity) that I promulgate
in this Article is more prevalent and prompts fewer objections. Before
exploring the core elements of this concept and describing its application by
national courts and states’ legislation, I will quickly review the unlimited
version of this concept and refer to some of the concerns raised against it.
A. The Controversy Over the Concept of Universal Jurisdiction
According to customary international law, universal jurisdiction is one of
the generally accepted bases on which a state may assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction.11 Universal jurisdiction is based on the universality principle,
used by most domestic jurisdictions, I will use it in Part III, in which I discuss the application of this principle
by domestic jurisdictions.
11 For an overview of the core international law instruments that pronounce this view, see generally Case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3,
¶ 60 (Feb. 14); Institut de Droit Int’l, Resolution on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime
of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes, Aug. 26, 2005, http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/
resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf [hereinafter IDI Resolution]; Int’l Law Comm., Draft Code of Crimes
Against Humanity and the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996); STEPHEN
MACEDO, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2011). See also Danielle Ireland-Piper,
Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Does the Long Arms of the Law Undermine the Rule of Law?, 13
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 122, 130 (2012).
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defined by Ian Brownlie as a principle adopted by “[a] considerable number of
states . . . usually with limitations . . . allowing jurisdiction over acts of nonnationals where the circumstances, including the nature of the crime, justify the
repression of some types of crime as a matter of international public policy.” 12
Another important aspect of universal jurisdiction is a very narrow, or even the
lack of a specific, self-interest that should be protected by the state asserting
universal jurisdiction13—in other words, when the offenses over which
jurisdiction is exerted “are not deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental
interests of the prescribing state, or, in appropriate cases, to give rise to effects
within its territory.”14
Nevertheless, universal jurisdiction is a widely debated doctrine in
international law.15 This is most evident in the fact that states have not yet
signed a general treaty on the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, nor have they
agreed on written standards for its application.16 Indeed, the international
community has set some international legal foundations through the adoption
of a considerable number of multilateral treaties dealing with international
crimes (such as slave trade, slavery and forced labor, war crimes, drugs and
terrorism) that demand the prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators,17 as
well as through resolutions of intergovernmental bodies,18 official drafts, and
studies.19 In addition, and mainly in the last decade, states have legislated laws
that endow them with the right for universal jurisdiction.20 Lastly, universal
jurisdiction is the legal principle at the foundation of international courts and

12

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (6th ed. 2003).
LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 5 (2003) (presenting research on states that apply universal
jurisdiction).
14 Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 735, 745
(2004).
15 See infra notes 24, 25, 27, 28 and accompanying text.
16 Claus Kreβ, Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International, 4
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 561, 562 (2006); REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 16.
17 REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 43–68.
18 For example, the U.N. Principles of International Co-Operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Id. at 69.
19 See, e.g., MACEDO, supra note 11; IDI Resolution, supra note 11; REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 73–78.
20 See REDRESS & INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 27 MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2–4
(2010),
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_In_the_27_Member_
States_of_the_European_Union.pdf [hereinafter EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION];
see also REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 81–226 (describing the universal jurisdiction in the municipal laws of
fourteen states).
13
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tribunals such as the ICC,21 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia,22 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.23
This controversial doctrine has invoked both support and criticism. The
proponents of the doctrine mainly mention its role in securing the interests of
“society at large . . . in defending the integrity and credibility of its legal order
and what it considers its essential interests and values,”24 thus preventing the
impunity of “high-ranking dignitaries involved in actions showing a marked
political dimension”25 and expressing a firm commitment to the protection of
human rights.26 Its opponents, on the other hand, have claimed that universal
jurisdiction prefers the victims’ interests over the rights of the accused, the
most prominent of the latter being the right to avoid double jeopardy and to be
protected from being persecuted by the authorities.27 In addition, they contend
that universal jurisdiction has been exerted mainly and manipulatively against
relatively minor suspects and could not, therefore, achieve its highest goal—
that is, to prevent impunity.28 Other critics have warned against the possibility
that a full application of the doctrine may inhibit the cathartic processes of
rehabilitation and reconciliation following mass atrocity.29 They also claim that
universal jurisdiction may hinder the transition from authoritarianism to
democracy and “the development and entrenchment of democratic institutions
and attitudes” that “encourage a sense of self-government,”30 enabled, for
example, by conducting trials of perpetrators of atrocities in the perpetrators’
own state. This controversy has generated the emergence of more subtle forms
of universal jurisdiction, whose supporters acknowledge the fundamental role
of states exercising universal jurisdiction in “a capacity . . . of a trustee of the
21 Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 2004 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
22 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
23 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 99, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
24 Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 596, 597 (2003).
25 Antonio Casesse, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 589, 595 (2003).
26 Id.
27 George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 580, 582 (2003).
28 Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the
Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2011).
29 Diane F. Orenlichter, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 214, 236–38 (Stephen
Macedo ed., 2004).
30 Pablo De Greiff, Comment: Universal Jurisdiction and Transitions to Democracy, in UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
124–26 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
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fundamental values of the international community,”31 and seek, for the
reasons explained below, for ways to limit the concept’s absolute nature.
B. Mitigated Universal Jurisdiction: Justifications
In recent years, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction has been narrowed
both in theory and in practice. Two important works have developed the
theoretical grounds for a limited version of universal jurisdiction. The first was
the 2001 Princeton Project.32 Supporting the proponents of universal
jurisdiction and yet aware of the principle’s challengers and critics,33 a group
of scholars and jurists in public international law, sponsored by Princeton
University’s Program in Law and Public Affairs and other international law
organizations,34 published a work on universal jurisdiction that aimed to
develop consensus principles on this doctrine in 2001.35 Along with defining
the scope and fundamentals of universal jurisdiction relating to issues such as
immunity,36 amnesty,37 and the types of crimes the doctrine addresses,38 the
scholars also accepted the conditioning of the doctrine on the resolution of
competing national jurisdictions and the concept of subsidiarity to national
legal systems.39 This can be described as a limited or mitigated version of
universal jurisdiction. The second work was conducted by the Institute of
International Law, whose 17th Commission accepted in 2005 a resolution on
universal jurisdiction that conditioned this doctrine, inter alia, on the principle
of subsidiarity.40
In addition to the research of these committees, other scholars have
promulgated an application of a limited version of the universality principle.41
In summary, they developed two concepts: “universality plus” and
31

Kreβ, supra note 16, at 567.
See generally MACEDO, supra note 11.
33 “Universal jurisdiction holds out the promise of greater justice, but the jurisprudence of universal
jurisdiction is disparate, disjointed and poorly understood. So long as that is so, this weapon against impunity
is potentially beset by incoherence, confusion, and, at times, uneven justice.” See id. at 23.
34 These organizations include: the International Commission of Jurists, the American Association for the
International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, and the Netherlands
Institute of Human Rights. See id. at 19.
35 Id. at 6.
36 Id. at 31.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 28.
39 Id. at 32.
40 IDI Resolution, supra note 11, ¶¶ 3(c)–(d).
41 See Cassese, supra note 25; Abi-Saab, supra note 24; Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 59 (Feb. 14).
32
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“conditional universality.” The former prefers the jurisdiction of the state that
has the most significant links to the crime;42 the latter is a moderate conception
of universality, according to which universal jurisdiction is applied only when
the territorial or national state fails to act.43 The mitigated version of universal
jurisdiction emerged through the practice of those states that legislated laws of
universal jurisdiction, applying both the idea of conditional universality44 and
that of universality plus.45
The arguments supporting mitigated universal jurisdiction and criticizing
what is referred to as “absolute universal jurisdiction”46 stem, nevertheless,
from a point of departure that accepts the vitality of universal jurisdiction and
does not aim to completely refute it. This perception rests, inter alia, on the
fact that the goals of universal jurisdiction, especially preventing impunity
from the perpetrators of international core crimes, are now universally
endorsed not only by many scholars but also by significant courts and
tribunals.47 Hence, the arguments presented hereinafter acknowledge “the vital
role [that] national courts . . . play in combating impunity even when
traditional jurisdictional connections are absent,”48 but they accept that these
advantages apply only when legitimate domestic processes conducting genuine
examinations of past atrocities are unavailable.
The scholarly criticism of universal jurisdiction, in sum, considers
questions of legitimacy, consistency, and externalized justice.49 The doubts
over the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction, stemming from a presumption of
bias when exerting universal jurisdiction, constitute a major consideration
against its application. Most critics argue that universal jurisdiction is applied
in courts of “developed countries pursuing dictators and war criminals from

42

Orenlichter, supra note 29, at 236.
Cassese, supra note 25, at 595.
44 See, e.g., infra Parts III.A.1, III.A.2, & III.A.4 (describing universal jurisdiction laws of Belgium,
Germany, and France).
45 See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3 (discussing Spanish legislation).
46 Cassese, supra note 25, at 595.
47 The ICC is the most obvious representative of these courts. See Marcus v. Croatia, no. 4455/10, ¶ 126,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014 (affirming the conviction of the appellant because “where a State agent has been charged
with crimes involving torture or ill-treatment, it is of the utmost importance that criminal proceedings and
sentencing are not time-barred and that the granting of an amnesty or pardon should not be permissible”).
48 Commentary to UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
49 See generally Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses,
19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 301, 357–74 (2003).
43
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developing countries, but not the reverse.”50 “The states seeking to apply
universal jurisdiction are largely countries of the ‘global north,’” which implies
that these activities are illegitimate and even neo-colonialist.51 In a recent and
comprehensive survey that aimed to cover all universal jurisdiction cases on
international core crimes brought to justice since Eichmann,52 Máximo Langer
argues that states avoid prosecuting major perpetrators of international core
crimes.53 He contends that, given the substantial costs in terms of international
relations paid by states applying universal jurisdiction, there are strong
incentives for universal jurisdiction prosecuting states to concentrate on
defendants who impose low international relations costs, as it is only in these
cases that the political benefits of universal jurisdiction prosecutions and trials
tend to outweigh the costs.54
In addition to destabilizing the legitimacy of the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction, the above argument also questions the doctrine’s consistency.
Inconsistent standards, such as those applied by states deciding whether to
apply universal jurisdiction in specific cases, give states a wide scope of
action. They can “vex and harass their political opponents,”55 while at the same
time preserving their political interests and assets.56
While the arguments of (il)legitimacy or (in)consistency criticize universal
jurisdiction in general, arguments of externalized justice more specifically
suggest that universal jurisdiction is inferior to domestic mechanisms of justice
in cases of societies in transition.57 Globalized justice is based on the rationale
that it “provides an antidote to the impunity that accomplished despots are
likely to enjoy in the countries that endured their crimes.”58 It thus may be the
only solution when a state or a society is unwilling or unable to come to terms
with the past because domestic justice is misled by the practice of amnesties or
the state’s legal institutions are paralyzed and cannot act.59 However,
externalized global justice seems to ignore the processes of transitional justice

50
51
52

Id. at 367.
Id. at 318.
See generally CrimA 40/61 Attorney-General of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann 36 I.L.R. 227 (1968)

(Isr.).

53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Langer, supra note 28, at 5–6.
Id.
Sriram, supra note 49, at 370.
Langer, supra note 28, at 5.
See Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 232; Sriram, supra note 49, at 312, 375–76.
Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 232.
Sriram, supra note 49, at 376.
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that have become prevalent since the 1970s in the form of truth commissions,
local trials, hybrid courts, and other measures aimed at rehabilitation and
reconciliation within societies that have suffered from atrocities.60 These
processes advance the transition to constitutional democracy61 and incorporate
the needs of those societies in transition as well as those of the victims of the
crimes.62
Transitional societies have numerous urgent needs that can include
achieving stability, developing and entrenching democratic institutions and
attitudes,63 and recovering from the implications of past mass atrocity,
reconciliation, and rehabilitation.64 Local prosecutions seem to serve those
goals much better than external ones.65 While internal prosecution may
reinforce in-country democratic processes,66 external prosecutions, by contrast,
can contribute to weak judicial and state capacity.67 In addition, “in-country
justice . . . advance[s] a wounded nation’s recovery in the aftermath of mass
atrocity”68 and promotes justice because it channels the desire for vengeance
over prior wrongs into a legal trajectory.69
Other advantages of local justice are related to assessing its ability to secure
the needs of the victims of mass atrocities.70 Although both external and
internal justice make victims’ stories public, officially endorse the truth, and
provide compensation to victims,71 they both also exhibit some deficiencies.
On the one hand, externalized justice better protects the interests of the victims
in states where the new regime, established after the humanitarian crisis, is not
democratic or fails in practice to secure human rights and the rule of law.72 On
the other hand, externalized justice may have other flaws. While external trials
provide acknowledgement of the crime,73 the sense of acknowledgment is
much weaker and less pervasive when it is engendered by an outside
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 232; De Greiff, supra note 30, at 124–25.
Sriram, supra note 49, at 375–76.
Id. at 379; De Greiff, supra note 30, at 124–25.
Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 236.
Id.
Id.
Sriram, supra note 49, at 382.
Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 236.
Sriram, supra note 49, at 382.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 386.
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institution, such as a foreign national court.74 Also, the distance of proceedings
may hinder the acknowledgement of the crimes because the victims may be
unaware of the proceedings or unable to participate.75
Lastly, internal justice systems may operate more effectively than external
justice systems because numerous practical issues can be resolved in a much
easier and more direct way in the territorial state or another state that has some
nexus to the crime (such as the state of the crime’s victim).76 For example, the
suspects are usually already present in the territory of the state of jurisdiction
so there is no need to operate procedures for extradition; the evidence and
interviewing witnesses are usually at hand;77 and finally, the lack of language
and culture barriers also smoothens the technical proceedings.78 However, if
the territorial state’s judicial system has collapsed and is not functioning
because of destabilizing circumstances, the arguments for better efficacy of the
internal justice systems will not prevail. The conclusion of the controversy
between internal and external justice supporters is that neither form of justice
is ultimately perfect. While globalized justice better secures the interests of the
international community in bringing perpetrators to justice, exacting
retribution, and denying amnesties, internal justice is better at reconciling the
interests of the specific community that suffered from atrocities, reestablishing
its own rule of law, ensuring justice for the victims, and executing efficient
investigations and trial proceedings. From this, I conclude that universal
jurisdiction should not be entirely neglected but rather limited by a principle
that would render it a second best option. Complementarity or subsidiarity79
can serve as such principles.
The principle of complementarity makes universal jurisdiction a more
practical and less objectionable concept. This principle was developed through
the ICC’s founding statute and, as I will show, is applied both by the ICC and
by states using universal jurisdiction. However, before delving into analysis of
this principle, I will explain why states have continued to apply universal

74

Id.
Id.
76 Brendan Leanos, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future of the International Criminal Court
Through Its Involvement in Libya, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2267, 2284 (2012). Professor Laplante gives reasons
for involving domestic courts in the proceedings of investigation and prosecutions. See id. at 2289.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See infra Part III for a brief discussion of the distinction and the similarities between complementarity
and subsidiarity.
75
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jurisdiction since the establishment of the ICC—in other words, I will examine
cases in which the ICC cannot operate.
II. LIMITATIONS OF ICC JURISDICTION
The main purposes for establishing the ICC—whose legal foundation is the
principle of universal jurisdiction—were to prevent the perpetration of
international core crimes, to punish their perpetrators, and to prevent
impunity.80 By constructing a special court for these purposes, the ICC also
intended to indirectly prevent a competition over the forum conveniens for the
prosecution of the perpetrators of international core crimes. It set a hierarchy of
appropriate forums whereby the courts of the territorial state (or another state
that has a connection to a specific case) are courts of first resort and the ICC is
a court of second resort, intervening only in cases where the territorial state
failed to investigate or prosecute.81 States that are parties to the Rome Statute
are instructed to cooperate with the Court,82 to allow the office of the
prosecutor (OTP) to launch investigations in their territory,83 to supply the
OTP with records and documents,84 and to comply with the Court’s requests
for arrest and surrender of suspects.85
The ICC’s jurisdictional provisions authorize the Court to hear “certain
cases, based upon the nature of the case, the parties involved, and how the case
was initiated.”86 In addition, the Court is able to overcome impediments that
would have barred states from applying jurisdiction on either a universal
jurisdiction basis or other bases of criminal jurisdiction, such as territoriality,
or active or passive personality. For example, a state that has jurisdiction over
a case may be “barred from proceeding with an investigation or prosecution
because the person concerned enjoys immunity under international law.”87 The
Rome Statute, on the other hand, does not recognize customary law
immunities.88 “Another conceivable example would be a resolution of the
80

Rome Statute, supra note 21, pmbl.
The concept of a court of second resort applies the concept of “mitigated universal jurisdiction.” See
discussion supra Part I.B.
82 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 86.
83 Id. art. 93.
84 Id. art. 93(1)(i).
85 Id. art. 89(1).
86 Leanos, supra note 76, at 2283.
87 See generally JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL
CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS (2009).
88 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 27(2).
81

KHEN GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

12/14/2015 11:29 AM

REVISITING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

273

Security Council under Chapter VII, prohibiting a State or States from
prosecuting a given (number of) individual(s).”89
Nevertheless, the ICC is limited in other situations where states are not.
The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited by four major conditions. First, its jurisdiction
ratione materiae is limited to four types of international crimes: genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.90 Second, its jurisdiction
ratione loci is limited to offenses that were committed on the territory of a
state that is party to the Rome Statute.91 Third, its jurisdiction ratione personae
is limited to offenses committed by nationals of states who are parties to the
Rome Statute.92 Fourth, its jurisdiction is narrowed by the complementarity
principle, which requires the ICC to serve only as a court of last resort and
only when a state that has nexus to the case is unwilling or unable to exert
criminal proceedings and trials.93
According to the Rome Statute, the U.N. Security Council can overcome
the ICC’s jurisdictional limitations ratione personae and ratione loci.94
However, the Council’s permanent members’ veto may obstruct such orders,
as in the case of Syria described at the beginning of the Article. By contrast,
states’ universal jurisdiction is limited only ratione materiae, in the same way
that the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited by the principle of complementarity.95
Hence, in cases where the offense has not been committed in the territory of a
state party to the Rome Statute or by a national of such a state party, the ICC
cannot investigate, let alone acquire jurisdiction, while the national courts of
independent states are able to.96
89

KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 158.
Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 5(1).
91 Id. art. 12.
92 Id. art. 12(2)(b).
93 Id. pmbl. See infra Part III for a discussion on the principle of complementarity.
94 The Rome Statute allows the U.N. Security Council to refer a case to the prosecutor of the Court even
when the Court does not have jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione loci. Rome Statute, supra note 21, art.
13.
95 See infra Part III.A for a discussion on the application of universal jurisdictions by states.
96 Note that the ICC’s jurisdiction is also limited ratione loci to cases that occurred in the territory of a
state party to the Rome Statute or in a territory of a state that accepts the court’s jurisdiction ad hoc the
jurisdiction of the court. See Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 12(3). This means that when a situation arises in
a territory that belongs to an entity not defined as a state according to international law principles, the ICC
does not have jurisdiction over the situation. This was the case when the Palestinian Authority addressed the
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and asked that the Court investigate the situation in the Gaza strip after the
Israeli Defense Forces launched operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008-January 18, 2009). The ICC
prosecutor determined that the Court was barred from intervening, and the Palestinian Authority could not ask
it to apply jurisdiction because the Palestinian Authority was not defined as a state according to international
90
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In addition, the ICC may be barred from acting when its extradition
requests are not answered. While states that are parties to the Rome Statute are
obliged to cooperate with the Court and to extradite suspects according to its
requests, states that are not parties to the Rome Statute are under no such
obligation. Because of this, the fact that the ICC does not conduct trials in
absentia97 if the suspect was not extradited to the Court means that it may not
be able to operate even when it acquires jurisdiction over a case. By contrast,
some states not parties to the Rome Statute are nevertheless parties to
international conventions that proscribe and criminalize war crimes,98
genocide,99 or crimes against humanity,100 so they are under an obligation to
prosecute or extradite the perpetrators of such crimes.101 Moreover, while there

law. See Palestinian Nat’l Auth., Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
(Jan. 21, 2009), for the declaration of the Palestinian National Authority recognizing the jurisdiction of the
ICC. See Situation in Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9B65
1B80-EC43-4945-BF5A-FAFF5F334B92/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf, for the OTP’s
decision. However, recently, “UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon confirmed that the Palestinians will
formally become a member of the ICC on April 1, 2015 and the Court's registrar said that jurisdiction would
date back to June 13, 2014.” Michelle Nichols, Louis Charbonneau & Thomas Escritt, U.N. Confirms
Palestinians Will be ICC Member on April 1, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2015, 6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2015/01/07/us-palestinians-israel-un-idUSKBN0KG1JV20150107. In addition, on January 16, 2015 the
OTP decided to open a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine. See Press Release, Office of the
Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a
Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1083.aspx.
97 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 63. The Trial Chamber may remove the accused only when the
accused continues to disrupt the trial, but it “shall make provision for him or her to observe the trial and
instruct counsel from outside the courtroom.” Id. art. 63(2).
98 For example, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. All states are
parties to these conventions. The four conventions will be hereinafter referred to as the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
99 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
100 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
101 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 98, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 98, art. 50; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 98, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 98, art. 146; Genocide Convention,
supra note 99, arts. 5, 7; Convention Against Torture, supra note 100, arts. 4, 5, 8.
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is controversy over the legality of universal jurisdiction in absentia,102 it is
more generally accepted that a prohibition on trials in absentia should not
include a prohibition on the commencement of investigation in the absence of
the suspect, as is indeed allowed by many continental legal systems.103 In
addition, there seems to be no customary rule prohibiting trials in absentia
based solely on universal jurisdiction,104 and as some continental law states do
not proscribe such trials,105 more trajectories are open for states to apply
universal jurisdiction when the ICC is blocked from interfering.
Under the above-discussed circumstances, when the ICC cannot apply its
jurisdiction, national courts must interfere by applying universal jurisdiction.
However, as suggested above, national courts, like the ICC, tend to limit their
jurisdiction through the principle of complementarity or subsidiarity. In the
following section I discuss this principle. I refer briefly to its origins and
analyze its basic parameters, which are reflected in the principle's demand that
external justice will be operated if the domestic (default) state is “unwilling or
unable” to exert its jurisdiction.106 Finally, I show that in recent years some
states have adopted the principle of complementarity in their own universal
jurisdiction legislation, referring to it as the “subsidiarity principle.” I review
the legislation of states that include this principle and analyze the main cases
where it has been applied by national courts.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
I will begin the discussion with a note on whether or not a distinction between complementarity and subsidiarity is required. The principle of subsidiarity dictates that “a central authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more
immediate or local level.”107 Complementarity, on the other hand, describes “a
relationship in which two or more different things improve or emphasize each
other's qualities.”108 Subsidiarity implies that universal jurisdiction is subsidi102 Kreβ, supra note 16, at 576; Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo
v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 9 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion by Guillaume, J.). Cf. Case Concerning
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 7 (Feb. 14)
(separate opinion by Higgins, Koojmans & Burghenthal, J).
103 Kreβ, supra note 16, at 576–77.
104 Id. at 578–79
105 O’Keefe, supra note 14, at 750.
106 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(1)(a).
107 Subsidiarity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015).
108 Complementarity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015).
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ary to local jurisdictions, that is, universal jurisdiction as a jurisdiction of last
resort; on the other hand, complementarity seems to posit that both the universal and the local jurisdiction are on par, so that both jurisdictions complete
each other’s deficiencies and function together as a unit,109 and neither is subsidiary to the other.
However, complementarity and subsidiarity are not entirely different, and
the resemblance between them is evident.110 Moreover, in the context of international criminal law and according to the interpretation of the principle of
complementarity by the Rome Statute of the ICC, which posits the Court as a
court of last resort, it seems that complementarity should be understood as a
synonym to subsidiarity, or as “a manifestation of subsidiarity in the [international criminal law] system.”111 Therefore, despite the fact that the Rome Statute uses “complementarity” while domestic criminal jurisdictions that apply
universal jurisdiction often use “subsidiarity” to refer to the principle that mitigates the application of universal jurisdiction or subjects it to several preconditions, the terms can be used interchangeably. I prefer the term “complementarity” because, as explained below, the concept of mitigated universal jurisdiction
was developed by the ICC's legacy, and the states that adopted the mitigated
concept relied on this legacy, notwithstanding their use of the term “subsidiarity” to refer to the mitigating principle.
Complementarity is one of the core principles of the ICC. It is established
as a legal principle112 both by the Preamble to the Rome Statute and by the
statute's first article, which declares that the ICC shall be “complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions.”113 With the idea that the ICC and domestic jurisdictions complete and perfect each other and supply each other’s deficiencies,114 the Rome Statute promulgates a system in which the prosecution of serious international crimes should involve measures at the national level and at
the international level.115 Moreover, the ICC determined that “the principle of
complementarity expresses a preference for national investigations and prose-

109

See KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 100.
GILAD NOAM, ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 379 (2012); see Hervé Ascensio, Are Spanish Courts Backing Down on Universality? The
Supreme Tribunal’s Decision in Guatemalan Generals, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 690, 696 (2003).
111 NOAM, supra note 110, at 380.
112 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 100.
113 Rome Statute, supra note 21, pmbl., art. 1.
114 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 100.
115 Id. at 100–01.
110
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cutions.”116 Therefore, national criminal jurisdictions are the default and first
resort for prosecution, while the Court is rather filling in their deficiencies. As
Louis Moreno Ocampo, the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, articulated his
view of the ICC when he was appointed:
The Court is complementary to national systems. This means that
whenever there is genuine state action, the Court cannot and will not
intervene. As a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases
that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the
contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of
the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.117

The main goal of the ICC—ending impunity for perpetrators of serious international crimes—seems to conflict with complementarity,118 as complementarity places the Court in a position secondary to national jurisdictions
for achieving this goal. However, Ocampo's words combined with the ICC's
reliance on the principle of complementarity suggest that the basic tenet at the
foundation of the ICC was in fact the concept of mitigated universal jurisdiction, rather than its absolute type; this former concept was believed to best
achieve the ICC's primary goal to end impunity for the world's most serious
crimes.119
The justifications for the principle of complementarity coalesce with those
supporting mitigated universal jurisdiction. Therefore, just like mitigated universal jurisdiction, complementarity is considered to achieve the goals of the
court by simultaneously safeguarding state sovereignty;120 empowering domestic jurisdictions throughout the world and encouraging them to build up their
domestic judicial systems;121 enhancing and promoting the emergence of a
norm of genuine national criminal proceedings;122 and ensuring that the ICC
interferes effectively when national criminal proceedings are committed in bad
faith or cannot be exerted.123
116 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ¶215 (May 31, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf.
117 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Statement Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor at the ICC, at 2 (June 16, 2003).
118 JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL
JURISDICTIONS 15 (2008).
119 Leanos, supra note 76, at 2281.
120 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 15.
121 Leanos, supra note 76, at 2281.
122 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 18.
123 Id. at 19.
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The secondary place of the ICC in relation to the primary role of national
jurisdictions124 is expressed in the admissibility rule established by Article 17
of the Rome Statute, which formulates a regime for the allocation of the judicial competences of the ICC and national criminal jurisdictions.125 According
to this regime, national jurisdictions have priority in the investigation and
prosecution of international core crimes, and cases are admissible before the
ICC only if the default prosecuting state is “unable or unwilling”126 to carry out
criminal (i.e., investigative or prosecutorial) proceedings.
The inability or unwillingness of the state that has jurisdiction must be clarified in order to determine the “winners of the competition” between the ICC
and domestic jurisdictions. However, three prior preconditions should prevail
to determine the presence of such a competition.127 Both jurisdictions should
address (1) the same case;128 (2) the same person;129 and (3) the same conduct.130 Even though these preconditions are relevant to determine the admissibility of cases before the ICC, I will not include them in my analysis of the
complementarity principle because it presupposes a competition between the
ICC and domestic jurisdictions and focuses on how to determine the winners
of this competition. Therefore, my point of departure is that these preconditions have already been fulfilled,131 and my analysis henceforth focuses on the
terms “unwillingness and inability.”132

124

KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 57, 99.
Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(1)(a).
126 Id.
127 The ICC also relates to these parameters as prior conditions for the evaluation of unwillingness and
inability. The Court stated: “[I]n considering whether a case is inadmissible under Article 17(1)(a) and (b) of
the Statute, the initial questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or (2)
whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned. It is only when the answers to these questions are in the affirmative that one has to
look to the second halves of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and to examine the question of unwillingness and inability. To do otherwise would be to put the cart before the horse.” See Prosecutor v. Gadaffi, Case No. ICC01/11-01/11 OA 4, Judgment, ¶ 213 (May 21, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1779877.pdf.
128 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(1)(a)–(b).
129 Id. art. 17(1)(b).
130 Id. art. 17(1)(c).
131 For the discussion of these parameters, see generally KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 114–25; STIGEN,
supra note 118, at 91–93, 197–99; NOAM, supra note 110, at 220–25. For an analysis of the ICC’s interpretation of these parameters, especially how the ICC determines whether the same case is investigated by competing domestic jurisdictions, see NOAM, supra note 110, at 259–98.
132 However, the “same case” precondition may be included among the “unwillingness or inability” parameters, because the state might prosecute a different case (for example, not characterize a killing as genocide) due to its unwillingness or inability to conduct genuine proceedings. See STIGEN, supra note 118, at 198.
125
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Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute determines that the unwillingness of a
state to conduct criminal proceedings shall consider the parameters listed below, and that in assessing these parameters the Court should have “regard to
the principles of due process recognized by international law.”133 The unwillingness of the prosecuting state is defined as follows:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court;

(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which
in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in
a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.134
The inability of the state is defined as “whether, due to a total or substantial
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”135
Before delving into the interpretation of the standards of unwillingness and
inability, two general remarks should be made. First, the inability and unwillingness are attributed to a state. Because the state is an abstract entity, its
“will” to act is referred to the will of its organs.136 Therefore, if one of the
state's branches of power (i.e., the executive, the legislature, or the judiciary)
expresses an unwillingness or inability to conduct a criminal investigation, the
state will be considered as unwilling or unable.137 Relatedly, the ability and
willingness (as opposed to inability and unwillingness) of the state are rather
determined upon the attitude of the state's composite organs.138 Therefore, the

133

Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2).
Id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c).
135 Id. art. 17(3).
136 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 254.
137 Int’l Law Comm’n, Text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, art. 4(1), in Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); STIGEN, supra note
118, at 255.
138 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 107.
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willingness of one organ to initiate criminal proceedings will not compensate
for the lack of such will on behalf of the other organs.139
Another preliminary question is which states are in fact in “competition”
with the ICC with regard to acquiring jurisdiction over a case. Article 17(1)
establishes that the relevant states are those that “[have] jurisdiction.” Determining which state has jurisdiction over a specific case is crucial for the discussion in Article 17(1) because it accounts for questions regarding the competition between different states over jurisdiction. If the states applying mitigated
universal jurisdiction accept the precondition that their jurisdiction may be
given up for “the state that has jurisdiction,” then the question of what it means
to “have jurisdiction” should be answered.
In the criminal context, jurisdiction refers to that exerted by the different
organs involved in different phases of criminal proceedings, such as the investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative authorities.140 In addition, jurisdiction
has different meanings in international and national law. Jann Kleffner suggests that both meanings should be considered, such that the definition of “‘a
State which has jurisdiction over a case’ refers to States which have established domestic jurisdiction in conformity with international law.”141 He adds
that under “the assumption on which complementarity is based, namely that
states have the possibility to exercise jurisdiction and have taken at least initial
investigative steps . . . [it is] decisive for the ambit of permissible action of national investigative or prosecutorial authorities that jurisdiction be available
under national law.”142 However, because “the ICC defers cases to States
which have the legal right, under international law, to exercise jurisdiction . . .
the term ‘jurisdiction’ thus needs to [also] be understood to refer to jurisdiction
in its international connotation.”143
Having defined the states that participate in the competition with the ICC
for jurisdiction over a case, I turn to analyze the conditions under which this
competition should be resolved: the willingness and ability of those states to
begin criminal proceedings. In the Rome Statute, the standards of unwillingness and inability were not clearly established.144 Indeed, whether these terms
139

Id.
Id. at 111.
141 Id. at 113.
142 Id. at 112.
143 Id. at 113.
144 Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and National
Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 236 (2002).
140
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should be interpreted broadly, so as to leave more room for the court to interfere, or restrictively145 is a matter of policy.
The delegates drafting the Statute believed that the ICC had too broad a
discretion in defining these terms, as all that the Statute provides as a guideline
of interpretation is that the ICC shall have “regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law.”146 In addition, the OTP addressed the
difficulties in interpreting the “unwillingness” of the state that has jurisdiction,
and assessed that “it will often require the Court to infer its conclusions from
highly circumstantial evidence, and those conclusions will often implicate ‘politically sensitive’ issues.”147
Nevertheless, scholars have suggested some very detailed and complex
interpretative criteria for both “unwillingness” and “inability.” In some cases,
scholars have relied on the interpretation of relevant international norms and
standards accounted for by various international law instruments—such as
international treaties,148 the decisions of human rights courts and
committees,149 the reports of international committees,150 and U.N.
instruments151—likely to prove that their suggested criteria do not stem merely
from a subjective analysis.
Stigen interprets “unwillingness” according to three factors mentioned in
Article 17(2): “shielding the person concerned,”152 “unjustified delay” in the
trial or investigative proceedings,153 and lack of independence or
impartiality.154 He then breaks down each of the factors into elements that
serve as criteria for interpreting them.155 For example, he suggests that
“shielding the person concerned” consists of five elements, the most intricate
of which is “the purpose of shielding.”156 This element alone requires assessing

145

STIGEN, supra note 118, at 252.
Ellis, supra note 144, at 236 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2)).
147 Leanos, supra note 76, at 2285.
148 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 129 (discussing the concept of fair trials).
149 See, e.g., id. at 139 (analyzing “unjustified delay”); STIGEN, supra note 118, at 266–67 (analyzing
limited access to the justice system).
150 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 269 (analyzing “[i]ntimidation of actors in the proceedings”).
151 Id. at 269–70 (analyzing “[i]ntimidation of actors in the proceedings”).
152 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2)(a).
153 Id. art. 17(2)(b).
154 Id. art. 17(2)(c).
155 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 256–309.
156 See id. at 261–62.
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twenty-three indications of such a purpose.157 A few examples of those
indications are: the existence of “[n]one or few successful investigations and
prosecutions” on behalf of the state that has jurisdiction,158 recognizing a
“[s]hared purpose between the state and the suspect,”159 and “inadequate
legislation” on behalf of the state that has jurisdiction so that it is not able to
deal with international crimes.160
Kleffner also discusses the three factors of unwillingness and bases his
conclusions on, inter alia, a linguistic analysis of the relevant terms in the
official languages of the Rome Statute,161 the reports of the ICC’s preparatory
committee,162 decisions of international tribunals,163 and international
treaties.164 For example, to assess the indicators of the purpose of shielding,
Kleffner relates to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s
(ICTY) decision regarding command responsibility for war crimes.165 Kleffner
also suggests that a superior who does not submit a matter of suspicion that his
subordinate committed war crimes to the investigation of competent authorities
will be considered as acting under a purpose of shielding the subordinate.166
Regarding the factor of unjustified delays, Kleffner analyzes the European
Convention on Human Rights’ protections of the right to be tried without due
delay and to a hearing within a reasonable time in the determination of
criminal charges.167
The standard of inability is more straightforward and objective,168 and yet it
still requires some inquiry. As mentioned above, inability refers to a “total or
substantial collapse or unavailability” of the state’s national judicial system
that prevents the state from executing criminal proceedings and undermines the
state’s ability to secure the accused or to obtain necessary evidence and
testimony.169 Inability is portrayed as a restrictive standard of interference
157

See id. at 262–88.
See id. at 263.
159 Id. at 264
160 Id. at 265.
161 See, e.g., KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 135 (discussing the purpose of shielding according to the
French version of the article).
162 Id. at 135 n.172 (discussing the terms “proceeding” and “national decision”).
163 Id. at 137.
164 Id. at 139.
165 Id. at 137 n.185.
166 Id. at 137.
167 Id. at 139.
168 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 152–53; Leanos, supra note 76, at 2286.
169 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(3).
158
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since the admissibility of cases before the court is limited, according to this
standard, to cases of either a total or a substantial collapse or unavailability of
the state’s judicial system.170 A partial collapse or unavailability, for example,
would not suffice.171 Nevertheless, distinguishing between a partial and a
substantial collapse or deciding when the threshold of substantial collapse is
met is not clearly defined in the statute.172 Kleffner suggests that the distinction
“can be derived from the ordinary meaning of the two terms and is confirmed
by the drafting history of Article 17(3). When shifting resources can
compensate such a partial collapse or transfer the trial to other venues, the
threshold of substantial collapse is not met.”173
Stigen adds that the level of the collapse can be assessed according to its
impact and duration, which must be “great and long enough to justify the use
of the term ‘substantial.’”174
Another relevant distinction is made between collapse and unavailability.
Unavailability seems to cover situations where a legal system has not collapsed
but is “inadequate (not accessible or not useful) for the purpose of dealing
genuinely with a given case.”175 Such is the case, for example, when the
judicial system has not collapsed but is too weak to carry out proceedings.176
Stigen proposes four factors that may lead to a judicial system’s unavailability:
(1) “inadequate legal provisions” (such as lack of substantive or procedural
penal legislation and lack of access to the system);177 (2) “legal obstacles to the
use of the system” (such as amnesties or lack of evidence and testimony);178
(3) “factual obstacles to the use of the system” (such as lack of necessary
personnel, judges, investigators, prosecutor; or lack of judicial
infrastructure);179 and (4) “the system’s incapability of producing the desired
result.”180 These factors are relevant both for “deficiencies in the
implementation of the specific legal framework for the investigation and

170

KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 153.
Id. (noting that the notion of “partial collapse” in earlier drafts of the Rome Statute was replaced by the
notion of “substantial collapse”).
172 Id. at 155.
173 Id.
174 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 316.
175 Id. at 317.
176 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 155.
177 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 318.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
171
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prosecution of core crimes . . . [and] the lack of implementation in domestic
legal orders . . . of international standards on procedural requirements.”181
The parameters of the standard of inability were practically applied recently
by the ICC in the case against Saif Al-Islam, the son of the former President of
Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, in which the ICC issued an arrest warrant for the
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.182 The Pre-Trial Chamber
stipulated that while the Libyan judicial system did not collapse, as “the
authorities for the administration of justice may exist and function in Libya,”183
the system was nevertheless unavailable for the purposes of the case.184 The
court added that there were legal obstacles to the use of the system, as the
national judicial system was unable to obtain the accused and secure AlIslam’s transfer from his place of detention under the custody of the Zintan
militia into state authority.185 It was also unable to obtain testimony because of
the inability of judicial governmental authorities to ascertain control and
provide adequate witness protection.186 In addition, it was unable to carry out
the proceedings and produce the desired result because it could not secure legal
representation for the accused in view of the security situation in Libya and the
risk faced by lawyers who act for associates of the former regime.187 This
impediment prevented the progress of proceedings against the accused as it
stood in contrast with the rights and protections of the Libyan national justice
system and Libya’s Constitutional Declaration,188 and rendered the national
judicial system unavailable and the case before the ICC admissible according
to the complementarity criteria set forth in Article 17(1)(3) of the Rome
Statute.
In summary of the analysis of the standards of willingness and ability, I
note that it is not always necessary to examine the presence of both
unwillingness and inability of a state with jurisdiction to decide the
admissibility of a case before the ICC; the presence of one standard is

181

KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 157.
Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-14, Warrant of Arrest, at 3 (June 27, 2011), http://www.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099329.pdf.
183 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ¶ 215 (May 31, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf.
184 Id.
185 Id. ¶ 206.
186 Id. ¶ 209.
187 Id. ¶ 212.
188 Id. ¶ 214.
182
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sufficient.189 Nevertheless, the independence of the judicial system is one
criterion that is common in assessing both willingness and ability of the
state.190 The judicial system of a state must, at a minimum, be judged as
independent if it is to be viewed as not experiencing a substantial or total
collapse of its institutions and therefore able to undertake prosecutions.191
However, the minimum standards for judicial independence would include a
judicial system that is impartial,192 which is also one of the factors of
(un)willingness. In Part IV, when discussing the implications of this Article’s
analysis for the Syrian case, I address further the criterion of independence and
its central place in determining which state should have jurisdiction.
Before turning to discuss the parameters of complementarity that emerge
from national legislation and the decisions of national courts (in most of these
statutes referred to as subsidiarity), I should note that there is no guidance in
the ICC jurisprudence regarding the standards of proof of the parameters of
unwillingness and inability in determining the admissibility of a case before
the ICC. As the Pre-Trial Chamber in Saif Al-Islam case mentioned:
Different standards of proof are explicitly set out in the Statute for
distinct stages of the proceedings from the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, to the confirmation of charges and the final trial judgment.
Those standards of proof, however, do not apply to the admissibility
determination which deals inter alia with the question as to whether
domestic authorities are taking concrete and progressive steps to
investigate or prosecute the same case before the Court.193
Rather, “[t]he Chamber is guided by the jurisprudence of the Appeals
Chamber to the effect that the State ‘must provide the court with evidence
of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value that demonstrates
that it is indeed investigating the case.’”194

189 See id. ¶ 216 (describing the Court’s determination in the Ghaddafi case that because “Libya has been
found to be unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution against [Ghaddafi] . . . the Chamber
need not address the alternative requirement of ‘willingness’”).
190 Ellis, supra note 144, at 237.
191 Id. at 238.
192 Id. at 237–38.
193 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, supra note 183, ¶ 54.
194 Id. ¶ 54 (quoting Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Judgment on the
Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled
“Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant
to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute,” ¶ 48 (Aug. 30, 2011)).
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A. Subsidiarity in the Practice of Domestic Legislation and Domestic Courts
In the last few decades, the number of states legislating laws of universal
jurisdiction has been rising.195 In addition to Australia,196 Canada,197 the United
States,198 and New Zealand,199 numerous European states have also legislated
such laws.200 According to the REDRESS and International Federation for
Human Rights (FIDH) report,201 which reviewed the legislation of member
states of the European Union, twenty-nine states have extraterritorial
jurisdiction.202 Twenty-five states limit their jurisdiction with a subsidiarity
clause.203 While these clauses differ in their formulations, they include general
common preconditions, such as the following: applying jurisdiction only when
the territorial state, another competent state, or an international court does
not;204 demanding extradition to be the first resort205 or conditioning
jurisdiction on receiving no extradition requests from other states;206
conditioning jurisdiction on the rule of double jeopardy;207 and dismissing
investigation or prosecution where an authority of another country or an
international tribunal is investigating the alleged crime.208 In addition, some of
the states that appear in this survey use a very similar wording in their
subsidiarity clauses to that of the ICC complementarity clause, and they
subject their jurisdiction to another state’s (usually the territorial or another
state that has a nexus to the case) only if the latter has a “properly functioning
195 See generally REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 83 (presenting research on states that apply universal
jurisdiction).
196 Id. at 86–92.
197 Id. at 119–25.
198 Id. at 220–26.
199 Juliet Hay, Implementing the ICC Statue in New Zealand, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 191, 196 (2004).
200 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 1–4.
201 See generally id.
202 The states are Austria, Slovakia, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Malta, Hungary, Lithuania, Ireland, Latvia, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Id. at iv–v.
203 Austria, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Malta, Hungary,
Latvia, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland. See id. at 39.
204 For example, in Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the courts are subsidiary to international tribunals and
the ICC; in Ireland the courts are subsidiary to the ICC; in Latvia and Spain, the courts are subsidiary both to
international courts and tribunals and to other national courts that have nexus to the case. See id.
205 See id. at 102, 131, 215, 219, 232 (Czech Republic, France, Portugal, Romania, and Slovenia,
respectively).
206 Id. at 166 (Italy).
207 Id. at 148 (Greece).
208 Id. at 253 (Switzerland).
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legal system”209 that has been verified as willing,210 independent, impartial,
and equitable.211
Except for Canada, which incorporated the ICC complementarity clause
into its universal jurisdiction law almost verbatim,212 states address the
considerations of the ICC clause mainly indirectly or comparatively within the
legislation and dicta that subject their universal jurisdiction laws to the
subsidiarity principle.213 Unfortunately, there is no clear consistent state
practice regarding the application of the parameters of the principle of
subsidiarity or the standard of proof required for its emergence.214
Nevertheless, I will hereby address the universal jurisdiction legislation in four
European states that address the subsidiarity principle either directly through
the law or through courts’ decisions that discuss the application of universal
jurisdiction.
1. Belgium
Belgium was the pioneer state in Europe for applying universal jurisdiction
to prosecutions of crimes under international law.215 As it was enacted in 1878,
Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law allowed for a wide-ranging scope of
jurisdiction.216 However, in 2003 the law was amended to limit this range.217
The Belgian law provides for universal jurisdiction in three cases. The first is
when grave violations of international humanitarian law are committed by a
person who at the time of the offense is a Belgian national or “who has been
effectively habitually and legally residing in Belgium for at least three

209

Id. at 203, 246 (Norway, Sweden).
Id. at 246 (Sweden).
211 Id. at 80 (Belgium). The preconditions mentioned in notes 208–10 will henceforth be referred to as the
“willingness and ability” conditions.
212 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c 24 (Can.) (Section 12 determines that the
double jeopardy protection (i.e., the pleas of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and pardon) applies unless the
proceedings in the foreign court were for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility or
were not otherwise conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process
recognized by international law, and were conducted in a manner that, in the circumstances, was inconsistent
with an intent to bring the person to justice.).
213 See, e.g., S.A.N., July 9, 2009 (R.G.D., No. 1/09) (Spain).
214 Kreβ, supra note 16, at 580.
215 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 77.
216 Loi concernnat le titre preliminaire du code de procedure [Law Containing the First Title of the
Criminal Procedure Code (TCCP)] of Apr. 17, 1878, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of
Belgium], Apr. 17, 1878, http://www.staatsblad.be.
217 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 78.
210
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years;”218 the second is when the victim of the crime is a Belgian citizen;219 the
third case is any offense under international customary or treaty law when
there is a legal requirement that the case be submitted to Belgian authorities.220
All of these cases are conditioned upon a subsidiarity paragraph that
determines that Belgium has jurisdiction in these cases unless
it appears . . . that . . . the case should be brought before either the
international courts, the courts of the place where the offence was
committed or the courts of the country of which the perpetrator is a
national . . . on condition that these courts offer the standards of
independence, impartiality and fairness required under the
international commitments linking Belgium to the state concerned.221

Investigations are conducted either as a result of the federal prosecutor’s
initiative or because a complaint has been lodged.222 In order to decide whether
to proceed with a complaint and to petition an examining magistrate to conduct
the preliminary inquiry, the federal prosecutor, under the control of the
indictment chamber, must verify the guarantees of impartiality, independence
and fairness provided by the competing national legal system or systems that
have jurisdiction over the case other than Belgium.223
According to the FIDH and REDRESS report, in practice the subsidiarity
concept will be invoked only where the court receives an effective submission
of a case of an international or foreign jurisdiction while the theoretical
competence of another court is not sufficient.224 So far, the application of the
subsidiarity principle by the federal prosecutor has not been required, and
therefore the courts have not been asked to consider this principle.
2. Germany
Like in Belgium, the German universal jurisdiction laws also address the
principle of subsidiarity. The universality principle is grounded in the German
218

Id. at 86.
Id. at 78 (provided that the foreigner is in Belgium and the act is punishable under the law of the place
of commission by at least five years imprisonment).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
222 Id. at 80.
223 Id. In addition, the prosecutor will not proceed with a complaint if it is manifestly unfounded, where
the facts in the complaint do not correspond to a relevant offense of serious violations of international
humanitarian law or of any other international offense incriminated by a treaty involving Belgium, and where
an admissible public action cannot derive from the complaint.
224 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 80.
219
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Penal Code225 and in the Code of Crimes Against International Law
(CCAIL).226 The subsidiarity principle is codified in the Code of Penal
Procedure.227 Section 6 of the Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) applies German law to
several acts committed abroad, inter alia, genocide and acts that are to be
prosecuted by the terms of an international treaty binding on the Federal
Republic of Germany, such as grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, torture, and hostage taking.228 In order to adjust the German
Penal Code to the Rome Statute of which Germany is a party, the CCAIL was
legislated in June 2002. This act makes the core crimes in the ICC—genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes—offenses under German law.229 The
subsidiarity principle is codified in §153f of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure (Strafprozessordnung or StPO), which states that
[T]he public prosecution shall dispense with prosecuting an offence
punishable pursuant to VStGB §§6 to 14 if . . . the offence is being
prosecuted before an international court or by a state on whose
territory the offence was committed, whose national is suspected of
its commission or whose national was harmed by the offense.230

The subsidiarity clause does not address directly the ICC complementarity
clause, but because “the Federal Constitution which provides that the general
rules of public international law are part of the domestic legal order and have
precedence over municipal laws,”231 it should be read and interpreted
according to the ICC complementarity clause, as proven in the Abu Ghraib
case.
In 2004, the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York filed a criminal
complaint against Donald H. Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense of the
United States, and against others who were accused of participating in crimes
according to the CCAIL, including torture and war crimes.232 The general
prosecuting attorney decided to dismiss the complaint and not to open an

225

Id. at 143.
See id.
227 Id. at 142.
228 REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 144; EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra
note 20, at 138–46.
229 REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 142–43.
230 STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 153f (Ger.).
231 REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 146.
232 Decision of the Prosecutor in a Complaint Against Rumsfeld et. al. Filed by the Center for
Constitutional Rights, File No. 3 ARP 207/04 2 (Feb. 10, 2005), www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/Rumsfeld
Germany.pdf [hereinafter Decision of the Prosecutor].
226
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investigation against the accused, basing his decision on a consideration of the
principle of subsidiarity as interpreted by the ICC complementarity clause.233
The prosecutor explained that universal jurisdiction (referred to as “the world
law principle”)234 “does not legitimize unlimited criminal prosecution,” and it
should be applied “in the framework of non-interference in the affairs of
foreign countries.”235 He based his inference on the ICC complementarity
clause, which according to his analysis, “has to be seen in the context of the
provisions of the CCAIL.”236 Therefore, he concluded that just as the “ICC can
only be active if the nation-states first called upon to adjudicate are unwilling
or unable to prosecute . . . a third state cannot examine the legal practice of
foreign countries according to its own standards or correct or replace it in
specific cases.”237 As a consequence, and since “no indications that the
authorities and courts of the United States of America are refraining, or would
refrain, from penal measures regarding the violations described in the
complaint,” and considering the fact that “several proceedings have already
been conducted against participant . . . the complaint must therefore be left to
the judicial authorities of the United States of America.”238
3. Spain
Spanish jurisprudence is, so far in history, the most instructive for the
application of the principle of subsidiarity in national universal jurisdiction
laws. Before 2009, the Spanish Fundamental Law of the Judiciary authorized
the Spanish legal system to apply absolute universal jurisdiction in some
cases.239 It stipulated that Spain could prosecute offenses where a binding
international treaty includes the obligation of exercising universal jurisdiction
and required no Spanish nexus to those offenses.240
In 2009, following some decisions of the Spanish courts aimed at limiting
the application of universal jurisdiction in Spain,241 the law was amended so as
233

Id. sec. B.
Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] [Law on the Judiciary] art. 23 (Spain) [hereinafter
Organic Law].
240 Id. art. 23(4).
241 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, International Decisions—Guatemala Genocide Case, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
207, 207 (2006) [hereinafter Guatemalan Genocide Case] (citing S.T.C., Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237));
Cedric Ryngaert, Applying the Rome Statute’s Complementarity Principle: Drawing Lessons from the
234
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to determine that unless international treaties or agreements request mandatory
trial of the crimes under the universality principle, Spain’s universal
jurisdiction should be limited and require some nexus to Spain, such as the
presence of the accused in Spain; the passive personality principle, i.e., that the
victims of the alleged offense have Spanish nationality; or the presence of
another link of outstanding importance to Spain.242 This amendment also
stipulated that Spanish courts could apply jurisdiction only in cases where
another country or international tribunal had not begun a process involving an
investigation and successful prosecution of such offenses; if another such
process existed, then the Spanish court should suspend or stay its case until the
other investigation and prosecution had concluded.243
These amendments were preceded by several conflicting decisions of the
Spanish courts regarding the question whether universality should be limited
and under which conditions. The Guatemalan Genocide Case244 dealt with a
complaint filed against Guatemalan officials allegedly responsible for crimes
of terrorism, genocide, and summary executions perpetrated against
Guatemala’s Mayan indigenous people and their supporters during the 1970s
and the 1980s.245 The Spanish Constitutional Court’s landmark decision in this
case supported broad universal jurisdiction and rejected former Spanish courts’
decisions on this case, which had subjected Spanish universal jurisdiction law
to the subsidiarity principle.246 According to the decision of the Spanish
Constitutional Court, neither nexus between Spain and the case nor proof of
the impossibility of a trial in the territorial state was required to apply Spanish
jurisdiction.247 Favoring the interests of preventing impunity and fearing that
endorsing subsidiarity would put complainants in the “untenable position” of
having to prove that they could not make a case in the territorial state, the
constitutional court preferred a close-textual interpretation of the Spanish

Prosecution of Core Crimes by States Acting Under the Universality Principle, 98 INST. INT’L L. 10 (2006)
(discussing the effects of the Guatemalan Genocide Case on the Tibetan Genocide case).
242 See EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 238–39.
243 Article 23(4)(2) to the Organic law stipulates that “it has to be proved that no proceedings have been
initiated in another competent country or an International Court leading to an investigation and effective
prosecution of the offences.” Id. at 239. Furthermore, the criminal proceedings initiated under the Spanish
jurisdiction “will be provisionally dismissed when there is evidence of the starting of other proceedings on the
reported actions in the country or in the Court abovementioned.” Id.
244 Guatemalan Genocide Case, supra note 241.
245 Id. at 207.
246 See Ascensio, supra note 110 (discussing the decisions of the Second Chamber of the Spanish
Supreme Tribunal and the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish National High Court).
247 Guatemalan Genocide Case, supra note 241, at 210.
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universal jurisdiction law. This determined a concurrence of jurisdiction and a
hierarchy between the Spanish courts and the Guatemalan court in favor of the
Spanish courts.248
However, later decisions of Spanish courts followed a different trajectory
and chose to subject Spanish courts’ jurisdiction to the principle of
subsidiarity, which was, in turn, conditioned upon evidence that territorial
courts and/or an international court were unwilling or unable to effectively
investigate and prosecute the crimes referred to in the complaint.249 The
“Tibetan Genocide” case emphasized that Spain could exercise universal
jurisdiction over genocide committed in Tibet in the absence of a “national
connection” with Spain. The National Court ordered the investigative judge to
open an investigation because the complainants could adduce evidence that
Chinese authorities failed to investigate the crimes and that the events
complained of were outside the jurisdiction of the ICC.250
In the Shehadeh Case, the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish National High
Court analyzed the subsidiarity principle in light of the ICC’s complementarity
clause.251 The Shehadeh Case inquired whether Spain had jurisdiction over a
complaint against several high-ranking Israeli officials who were allegedly
involved in a targeted killing operation executed on July 22, 2002 in the Gaza
Strip.252 The operation was directed at the commander of the Hamas military
wing in Gaza, Salah Shehadeh, and resulted in the deaths of Shehadeh and
thirteen other civilians and the injuring of dozens of civilians in the vicinity.253
In a decision on an appeal against the decision of the investigative judge on the
matter, the National High Court determined that Spain had no jurisdiction over
the case, inter alia, because of
[T]he absence of the absolute nature of the principle of universal
jurisdiction in Spain, in which the criterion of alternative jurisdiction
is generally given priority over the criterion of concurrence, and . . .
also [because] the former principle must be modulated in each case
by logical rules of rationality, proportionality and self-restriction that

248

Id.
Ryngaert, supra note 241, at 10.
250 Id. at 10.
251 S.A.N., July 9, 2009 (R.G.D., No. 1/09) (Spain) [hereinafter Shehadeh Case].
252 Id.
253 Salah Shehadeh-Special Investigatory Commission, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 27, 2011),
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/State/Law/Pages/Salah_Shehadeh-Special_Investigatory_Commission_27Feb-2011.aspx.
249
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will facilitate its effective implementation in those cases in which the
impunity of the possible abominable crimes committed is at risk.254

The court compromised between subsidiarity and absolute universality,
which, it deduced, rested, inter alia, on the nuances that national law,
international law, and judicial decisions have added to the principle of
universal justice.255 Among the sources that determine the nuances of the
principle of universality, the court mentioned and cited the complementarity
clause of the ICC, thus emphasizing the unwillingness and inability criteria.256
Finally, in its consideration of the factors that should limit universality in
the specific case before it, the court took the unwillingness and inability
criteria into account only indirectly. The court gave up its jurisdiction because
the case was being genuinely investigated by Israel.257 The court found that
“there have been real actions, first administrative and then judicial, genuine
action has been made, first, on the part of the government and then on the part
of courts, to check whether an offense may have been committed.”258 It also
emphasized the impartiality of the investigation committee for the case
appointed by Israel and suggested that there was no ground to dispute the
“organic and functional separation” between the investigating committee and
Israeli legal authorities such as the Executive of the Israeli Military Advocate
General and the Attorney General of the state.259 This analysis suggests that the
court was convinced both of Israel’s genuine willingness to investigate the case
and of its ability to do so; the impartiality of Israel’s legal system attested to
both parameters of the complementarity clause.
The Spanish National High Court’s discussion of the principle of
subsidiarity in light of the ICC complementarity clause followed a former
dispute between the Spanish courts over those principles, which is extrapolated
from their decisions in the Guatemalan Genocide Case discussed above. While
the Audencia Nacional (like the National High Court in the Shehadeh Case)
conditioned the principle of subsidiarity on the inactivity of the territorial
forum in a specific case,260 the majority opinion in the Supreme Tribunal’s
254

Shehadeh Case, supra note 251.
Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Guatemalan Genocide Case, supra note 241, at 208 (concluding that the Guatemalan court was not
proven inactive).
255
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decision of the Guatemalan Genocide Case rejected the idea that Spanish
courts should evaluate the unwillingness and inability of other national courts.
According to the majority opinion of the Supreme Tribunal, this task of
evaluation was exclusively endowed to the ICC; national courts should avoid
such an evaluation because it is an ultra vires act: they are not competent to
judge the performance of other states’ legal systems. Furthermore, such
evaluations interfere with international relations, an exclusive realm of the
government of which the judiciary should be excluded.261 By contrast, the
minority opinion of the Supreme Tribunal in the Guatemalan Genocide Case
conditioned the Spanish courts’ subsidiarity to the territorial court on serious
and reasonable evidence proving the inactivity of the territorial court.262 This
was also the course of interpretation of the complementarity clause followed
by the National High Court in the Shehade Case, as shown above.
4. France
Universal jurisdiction in France is codified in the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CCP),263 providing for France’s universal jurisdiction over crimes
that France has a duty to prosecute under international treaties.264 On August 9,
2010, the law was amended to incorporate the Rome Statute into French
legislation, so that France’s obligations under its universal jurisdiction law now
include the duty to pursue any suspected criminal of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or genocide.265
The amendment of the CCP also demanded that France’s universal
jurisdiction be limited by the residence of the suspect in France, the general
prosecutor’s exclusive authority to begin an investigation, double criminality
(i.e., that the conduct is considered a crime under the legislation both of the
state where the offense was committed and of France) and by subsidiarity

261

Ascensio, supra note 110, at 694.
Id. at 695.
263 CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] (Fr.).
264 Id. arts. 696-4, 698-11.
265 Id. Formerly, the U.N. Security Council Resolutions that determined the establishment of the
international criminal tribunals in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia were incorporated in French law so as to
order France’s obligation to pursue any suspected criminal of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide if committed in the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda, when the suspect is present on French territory.
See EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 131.
262
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either to the ICC266 or to other states that have jurisdiction over the case and
seek the suspect’s extradition.267
Among the preconditions that forbid extradition to another state competing
for jurisdiction, the CCP includes the following:
Where the offence for which the extradition has been requested is
punished by the law of the requesting state which imposes a penalty
or a safety measure contrary to French public policy;
Where the requested person would be tried in the requesting state by
a court which does not provide fundamental procedural guarantees
and protect for the rights of the defence.268

A comparison of the subsidiarity clause in the French legislation with the
ICC complementarity clause suggests that the French legislation does not
consider either the competing state’s ability to apply its jurisdiction or (at least
directly) its willingness. It rather focuses on the demand that the competing
state “regard the principles of due process recognized by international law.”269
It also gives substantial importance to the procedural demands of the French
law by denying extradition in cases in which the legislation of the requesting
state determines a punishment or a security measure that contradicts the French
public order.270
An example of how the French law subsidiarity clause focuses on the
international law principles of due process can be seen in a request that was
filed to a French court to extradite to Rwanda a Rwandan citizen who was
alleged to have committed crimes against humanity and genocide.271 The
Chamber of Instruction of the Court of Appeal of Toulouse based its decision
not to extradite on deficiencies in the criminal process in Rwanda that
infringed upon the defendant’s rights for due process. First, the court
determined that the Rwandan law would be applied retroactively, in contrast to
the basic principle of international criminal law forbidding retroactive
criminalization. Second, the equality of arms principle (i.e., that the defense
and the prosecution can equally perform their duties) was jeopardized because
266

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 131.
Id. at 132.
268 CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 696-4 (Fr.).
269 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2). It can be argued that a state that does not apply the principles
of due process recognized by international law is deemed unwilling to conduct genuine criminal proceedings.
Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the case.
270 CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 696-4. (Fr.).
271 See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, Oct. 23, 2008, 2008/00029.
267
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the lack of means of protection for defense witnesses would have prevented the
defense from presenting all of the protecting evidence it had. Third, the
sentence that was expected to be imposed on the accused—twenty years of
isolation—was considered by the French legal system to be a degrading and
humiliating sentence.272
To conclude the general part of this Article, in the last decade the doctrine
of universal jurisdiction has been entrenched by national courts and national
legislation that aim to expand the jurisdiction of national courts. This was
achieved by a revision of national laws to comply with states’ obligations
under the Rome Statute and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals to
prevent impunity from the perpetrators of international core crimes.273
However, the application of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction has been
mitigated by the principle of complementarity, according to which national
courts of foreign states will yield firstly before national courts of territorial
states and secondly before the ICC or other international tribunals.274
Nevertheless, those foreign national courts will not avoid applying their
jurisdiction in cases where the former courts could not pursue genuine criminal
procedures. As illustrated through the discussion of state practice, states that
have universal jurisdiction laws carefully examine whether the terms of
subsidiarity have been fulfilled, and only in such circumstances do they avoid
exerting universal jurisdiction.
In the following section of this Article, I examine the implications of these
conclusions for the Syrian case. Beginning with an analysis of the emergence
of the Syrian state and the Ba’ath regime’s take-over, I proceed with a review
of the tensions among Syria’s various religious and ethnic sects. Finally, in an
overview of the evolution of the 2011 uprising, I discuss the question of
whether and under what circumstances foreign national courts should apply the
principle of mitigated universal jurisdiction to adjudicate the perpetrators of
international core crimes during the bloody conflict in Syria. It should be noted
that a thorough analysis of the sociological and historical reasons for the
emergence of the 2011 uprising in Syria is beyond the scope of this Article. I
will focus more on the dynamics of Syrian society before and during the
uprising in order to assess the implications of its cohesive and divisive forces

272

Id.
See Sriram, supra note 49, at 364.
274 See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, Oct. 23, 2008, 2008/00029. See
generally Decision of the Prosecutor, supra note 232.
273
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on its ability to conduct criminal legal procedures for perpetrators of
international core crimes.
IV. THE SYRIAN CASE
A. The Syrian Society: Between Factionalism and Cohesion from the French
Mandate to the 2011 Uprising
The Syrian state, now called the Syrian Arab Republic, underwent several
formative stages before it finally emerged with its current borders. It was first
established as a kingdom by the Hashemite Emir Faysal with British help
between October 1918 and July 1920, following the destruction of the Ottoman
Empire.275 This kingdom was dismantled by France, which in 1920 was
assigned the mandate of some parts of Syria by the League of Nations and
established several states there—Greater Lebanon and a number of small states
that included a Druze and an Alawi state.276 In 1925, the French re-established
a Syrian state through the merger of Damascus and Aleppo, but the Alawi and
the Druze277 areas remained separated from this state, in practical terms, until
1945,278 a year before the Syrian state emerged to gain its independence.279
The process of the emergence of the state of Syria thus has the fractures in
Syria’s “mosaic society” folded within it,280 i.e., the division between the
different sects in Syria and their struggle over power.281 The Druze and the
Alawis are the most evident minorities in Syria,282 but Syria is also religiously
divided between Islamic Sunnis, who form the largest religious group in Syria,

275 Itamar Rabinovich, The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918–45, 14 J. CONTEMP. H. 693,
695 (1979).
276 Id.
277 See id. at 693–94 (referring to the Alawi and the Druze as the “compact minorities”).
278 Id. at 695–96. In 1936, an attempt was made to incorporate the Druze and the Alawi areas into the
Syrian state under a special status but this attempt failed and the merger was suspended in 1939. See id. at 696.
279 Id.
280 Raymond Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, 6 H. COMPASS 263, 276 (2008) [hereinafter
Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics].
281 See generally AJAMI, supra note 2, at 111–34; NIKOLAOS VAN DAM, THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN
SYRIA (2011).
282 The Alawis constitute twelve percent of the Syrian population. See Daniel Pipes, The Alawi Capture of
Power in Syria, 25 MIDDLE E. STUD. 429, 430–32 (1989). Their religious doctrines derive from the Twelver or
Imami branch of Shi’i Islam, but they reject the Shari’a (Islam’s sacred law) and are therefore considered nonMuslims. See id.; see also AJAMI, supra note 2, at 15–17. The Druze, who constitute three percent of the
Syrian society, are also a “radical Shiite sect.” See VAN DAM, supra note 281; Rabinovich, supra note 275, at
693.
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Isma’ilis (1.5 percent), and Christians (14.1 percent).283 Ethnically, it is divided
between Syrian Arabs (around seventy-four percent), Kurds (8.5 percent),
Armenians (four percent), Turcomans (three percent), and Circassians, who
constitute the smallest ethnic minority.284 Another line of sectarianism is the
class division “between the ruling landed and commercial oligarchy, a rising
radical middle class . . . and an aggrieved peasantry.”285
All of the above fractures played a role in reshaping the state of Syria,
which continued after Syria gained its independence and until the coup of
1963, when the Ba’ath party gained rule over Syria.286 From 1946 to 1963, the
government was composed of the Sunnis, and especially the urban Sunni
elite.287 Eventually, the Sunnis’ success in eliminating the Alawi state and the
integration of this state within Syria contributed to the Alawis’ “rapid rise to
power.”288 The Sunnis’ resentment of the Alawis has not prevented the latter’s
over-representation in the army,289 which was one of the two key factors that
paved the way for the Alawis to take control of the government in Syria.290 The
second factor was the Ba’ath party, which the Alawis took over in February
1963 in a coup that enabled the Ba’ath coup d’état of March 1963 and the
Assad coup of November 1970.291 The Ba’ath coup started as a reform coup
and led to a substantial change in the composition of the elite (forming a new
rural elite involved in the social and national struggles of the 1950s)292 and in
the regime’s legitimacy basis (based on nationalism, modernization, and
institutional design). This latter change, in turn, led to a transformation of
social structure.293
283 ZAKIR HUSSAIN, INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, ISSUE BRIEF: POST-ASSAD GEOSTRATEGIC
POSSIBILITIES 3 (2012), http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/IBpostassad.pdf.
284 VAN DAM, supra note 281, at 1.
285 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, 88 INT’L AFF. 95, 96
(2012) [hereinafter Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?].
286 See generally VAN DAM, supra note 281. The Ba’ath rule persisted until the 2011 uprising and in fact
has not completely lost control in Syria. Id.
287 Pipes, supra note 282, at 440. Between 1958 and 1961 Syria created a political union with Egypt,
called “the United Arab Republic” in order to revive the Arab nation. The merger ended in 1961 when Syria
withdrew from the union. For a discussion of the union and its failure, see Monte Palmer, The United Arab
Republic an Assessment of Its Failure, 20 MIDDLE E. J. 50, 50 (1966).
288 Pipes, supra note 282, at 440.
289 The Sunnis ignored the army as a tool of state and believed that reserving the top positions for
themselves in the army would suffice to control the military forces. See id. at 440–41; AJAMI, supra note 2, at
24–25.
290 Pipes, supra note 282, at 440.
291 Id. at 442.
292 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96.
293 Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 268.
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This revolution was developed and deepened by the authoritarian regime of
Hafiz al-Assad. Raymond Hinnebusch observes that al-Assad created a stable
regime294 “through the lens of neo-patrimonialism [and] the concentration of
power in the regime through the construction of clientele networks around the
presidency.”295 Al-Assad managed to create a “‘loyalty system’ under
which . . . elites were given license to enrich themselves and thereby were
‘implicated’ in the regime.”296 Hinnebusch suggests that Al-Assad’s successful
efforts to consolidate Syria were enabled by a “dark side,”297 referring both to
“the mafia-like clans . . . whose corruption and smuggling undermined state
policy”298 and to the role of repression in regime consolidation—a repression
created through an army made up of “guard units recruited from [Assad’s] kin
and sect that defended the regime”299 and through the pervasive public
surveillance in Syria as a mukharabat (intelligence) state.300
Economic factors and liberalization reforms also contributed to the stability
of al-Assad’s regime.301 The revolution enabled rapid social mobility for the
lower classes, “especially from the villages and minorities,”302 and
consolidated an alliance between “Alawi power brokers and the Damascene
Sunni merchant class” (a “military-mercantilist complex,” as one commentator
called it).303 The regime went through several cycles of liberalization in its
economy, resulting in a greater scope for the private sector.304 Yet, the
economic liberalization was followed by only limited political liberalization,
“amounting to a mere decompression of authoritarian controls and greater
access for the bourgeoisie to decision-makers,”305 and did not develop as a
stage towards democratization.306 These processes of liberalization led civil

294 That stability was slightly shaken in the 1980’s when an Islamic revolution from within was attempted,
but eventually was repressed by al-Assad’s regime. See id. at 270; AJAMI, supra note 2, at 84; Eyal Zisser,
Syria, the Ba’th Regime and the Islamic Movement: Stepping on a New Path?, 95 MUSLIM WORLD 43, 47
(2005).
295 Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 269.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 273–74; Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at
96.
302 Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 270.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 273.
305 Id. at 274.
306 Id.; Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 103–04.
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society to demand democratization after the death of Hafiz al-Assad, but their
aspirations were soon repressed by Hafiz’s successor, his son, Bashar alAssad.307
Bashar al-Assad followed the path his father had paved but intended to
“upgrade” his authoritarian regime.308 At the start of his rule, Bashar “was
popular as a modernizer with the public, especially with the younger
generation, and hence represented both continuity and change.”309 Bashar’s
intentions were to “foster modernizing cadres” and to increase reforms in state
institutions to limit corruption and waste by promoting economic, cultural, and
technological liberalization (even if to a limited extent).310 However, these
have currently failed, contributing to the debilitation of the regime through the
2011 uprising.311
The reasons for Bashar’s failure are rooted in the sectarianism of Syrian
society.312 Because Syria lacks a distinct national identity, the Ba’ath regime
consolidated the Syrian society and bridged its sectarian ruptures through the
ideology of Arabism.313 “Arguably, Arab nationalism was the most successful
ideology in filling the post-Ottoman identity vacuum” because it bridged the
cleavages between the factions in the Syrian Arabic-speaking populations.314
For the Ba’ath, it was a means for overcoming its political competitors—on the
one hand, the Syrian Social National Party, and on the other hand, the religious
alternative of the Muslim Brotherhood.315
However, in order for the Ba’ath to continue its hold on Syrian society
through the ideology of nationalism,316 it had to preserve its social basis, a
mission that Bashar failed to achieve.317 Bashar’s initiated reforms were
307

Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 274.
Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 95.
309 Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 274.
310 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 98, 104.
311 Id. at 95, 106, 113.
312 For a discussion of sectarianism in Syria and its linkage to the struggle for power in the state, see
generally VAN DAM, supra note 2; AJAMI, supra note 2, at 111–34.
313 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96; Hinnebusch,
Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 263–64.
314 Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 264; Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian
Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96.
315 Zisser, supra note 294, at 46–48.
316 The ideology of nationalism had also some disadvantages, for example, positioning Syria against
western imperialism and entangling it in the Palestinian issue. See Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian
Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96.
317 Id. at 112.
308
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accompanied by his restructuring of the regime’s social base by abandoning
the “old guard” and “retir[ing] the older generation.”318 The Ba’ath ideology
was hence neglected; however, “no bourgeois party arose to organize
supporters of [Bashar’s] neo-liberalism.”319 Moreover, other ideologies were
competing for power, especially Islamist.320 Bashar tried to foster moderate
Islam in order to prevent the emergence of more radical currents and to tame
secular opposition to his regime.321 His efforts were focused on controlling and
taming Islam.322 In this way, although he allowed the incorporation of Islamist
representatives into parliament and assured the ulema,323 the economic
freedom to manage Islamic financial institutions, he did not allow Islamists to
be fully politically incorporated or to participate in free elections.324
This exclusion of the Islamists from fully participating in politics illustrates
Bashar’s aversion to democracy in Syria and his inflexible attitude to the
activities of human rights organizations.325 Even though Bashar’s first year of
ruling, known as “the Damascus Spring,” allowed for economic reforms and
openness to the West—including the establishment of human rights
organizations, civic forums, and even the release of political prisoners—this
period ended with the arrest of large numbers of human rights activists during
summer and autumn of 2001.326 Because of the “exceptional thirst of the
Syrian middle class for freedom,”327 however, a majority of Syrian
oppositional groups, parties, and independents signed the Damascus
Declaration in 2005, demanding gradual democratic reform.328 Twelve figures
leading this initiative were sentenced to serve time in prison in 2008, and no
one else stepped forward to oppose Bashar until 2011.329

318

Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 112.
320 Zisser, supra note 294, at 54–59.
321 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 105.
322 Id. at 112.
323 The ulema are “those who have had special training in the knowledge of Muslim religion and law, and
are regarded by Muslims as the authorities on these matters.” Ulema, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015).
324 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 104–05, 112.
325 See Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 13.
326 Id.
327 AJAMI, supra note 2, at 8. The author cites Professor Burhan Ghalioun, a Homs-born professor of
political sociology at the Sorbonne University in Paris who left Syria in 1971 but visited as an active
participator in the Damascus Spring events and in the Damascus Declaration of 2005. Lungren-Jörum, supra
note 2, at 14. Ghalioun was a member of the civic leadership of the 2011 uprising. Id. at 16.
328 Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 13.
329 Id.
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The 2011 Syrian uprising started as a civil rebellion motivated by the
demand for political rights and civil liberties for the Syrian people.330 In March
2011, a group of young children in Dar’a were arrested and brutally tortured
for writing graffiti against the regime. Non-violent protests against the regime
broke out, gradually spreading to other towns and villages,331 and soon became
a nationwide uprising against the regime.332 Facing the regime’s harsh military
reaction to the civil demonstrations, the struggle evolved into a military
insurgency, initially with the establishment of the Free Syrian Army in July
2011.333 The struggle later saw the emergence of other rebel militia alliances,
such as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, the Syrian Islamic Front, and the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), mainly religious groups expressing
different interpretations of Sunni Islamist ideology and whose motivations for
the struggle differ from those of the original demonstrators.334 The Kurds also
formed a militia group called the Democratic Union Party, which is a Syrian
Kurdish franchise of the PKK organization.335
For the purpose of this Article, it is important to inquire into the rebel
groups’ and demonstrators’ motivations for initiating the struggle, as well as
their aspirations for the future of Syria. Equally important is the question of the
level of cohesiveness and unification that could be created between the
different rebel groups.
In contrast to the above description of Syria as a divided and sectarian state,
the prominent speakers of the coalition of committees formed by the
opposition to the regime inside and outside of Syria336 resist the view of Syria
as a mosaic society.337 They intend to defeat the regime’s strategy of “‘divide
330

Ismail, supra note 2, at 542; Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 13; AJAMI, supra note 2, at 10–13.
Another notable event that sparked the uprising occurred in Hama, where the body of a young and
terribly abused cement layer was dragged from the Orontes river. AJAMI, supra note 2, at 10. The protests then
spread to more towns and villages, including “the coastal cities of Baniyas and Latakia, the outskirsts of
Damascus, and then, Homs, Hama and the smaller towns of Rastan, Talbisseh, Maaret al-Noman, Jisr alShughour and Idlib.” Id. at 88.
332 Ismail, supra note 2, at 539. The regime succeeded in keeping Aleppo and Damascus—the capital city
in which the regime struggled desperately to survive—outside the rebellion by placing military camps and
loyal Alawi migrants at the strategic approaches to both cities. See AJAMI, supra note 2, at 90–92.
333 Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 18.
334 Jonathan Spyer, Fragmented Syria: The Balance of Forces as of Late 2013, 17 MIDDLE E. REV. INT’L
AFF. 9, 12–13 (2013).
335 Id. at 14.
336 See Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 16–18, for the interviews with Burhan Ghalioun, as well as with
Michel Kilo, a senior opposition activist and a member of the Committee for Coordination of Democratic
Change established in June 2011.
337 Id. at 17.
331
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and rule’ . . . [which] perpetuated social antagonism and resentment along
sectarian and ethnic lines.”338 Their vision for the future of Syria is of a unified
Syrian people and a sense of solidarity, and they motivate a dialogue among
Syrians of all backgrounds and religious affiliations.339 They view future Syria
as a civil, democratic state, possibly with an Islamic reference depending on
the outcomes of elections.340 They insist that the uprising is against “the rule of
a certain family” and not against a sect (i.e., the Alawi sect).341 As Burhan
Ghalioun states, “every individual member” of the National Syrian Council342
“represents the entire Syrian people, not just people who happen to share his or
her background.”343
However, the unifying a-sectarian vision described above does not
necessarily reflect the reality on the ground. Since the late 1920s Syria has
been described as “a country . . . [which] militated against national unity and
the formation of patriotic sentiment.”344 As Fouad Ajami observes, “[the] lines
of sect and community had not gone away and that world in Greater Syria . . .
had not found a way out of the hold of sectarianism.”345 The Syrian opposition
thus faces practical realpolitik challenges. Despite its aspirations for creating a
national unity government,346 the opposition’s disparity and the difficulties it
has had joining up its forces have long been known.347 With the evolution of
the uprising into an armed conflict between the regime and armed groups,
more groups and ideological currents have occupied territories and want to
enforce their own perception of the Syrian state.348 Moreover, and despite the
opposition’s welcoming attitude towards the Alawis, the regime’s long-years
protection of this sect together with the Alawis’ sense of persecution might
338

Ismail, supra note 2, at 540–41.
Id. at 543.
340 Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 26–27.
341 Id. at 17. The Alawi community, referred to as the “esteemed community” (al-taifa al-karima), is
viewed as innocent of the crimes of the al-Assad family. AJAMI, supra note 2, at 122–23.
342 The National Syrian Council was established in October 2011 in an attempt to unify the demonstrators
under a recognized leadership. Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 14. The council included representatives from
all parts of the ideological spectrum as well as ethnic and religious minority groups. Id. It has a 230-seat
general assembly with fifty-five seats reserved for grass root activists inside Syria and a twenty-nine member
executive committee. Id.
343 Id. at 17.
344 AJAMI, supra note 2, at 116.
345 Id.
346 In the first stages of the uprising, even the Committee for Coordination of Democratic Change, the
biggest opposition bloc, aspired for cooperation with the regime if it changed its ways and met the committee’s
fundamental demands. See Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 23.
347 Id. at 13; see also Spyer, supra note 334, at 13.
348 See generally Spyer, supra note 334.
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very well result in the Alawis remaining loyal to Bashar al-Assad. As an
Alawite writer using the pseudonym Khudr has stated: “[T]he Alawis lack [a]
sense of confidence and belonging . . . They will have to “fight to the end” and
stay with the Assads, doubts and all.” 349
The opposition groups, therefore, understand that the fear that “Syria’s
diverse religious groups . . . would retrench to positions based on narrow
communal identities”350 might actualize. As a consequence, the opposition, in
the struggle for the future of Syria, aims at overcoming the tensions between
the concept of an inclusive nation and the promotion of a civic identity of
equal rights and obligations on the one hand, and the need to take into account
and incorporate distinct, communally based practices and relations on the other
hand.351 Considering the evolution of the struggle, the increasing number of
radical religious groups, and the current geographical division of Syria as more
groups occupy various territories, there remains the question of whether the
pioneering demonstrators’ utopian vision of unity will ever be realized. In
addition, the question of the level of cohesiveness that will be achieved at the
end of civil war will have implications for this society’s ability and willingness
to bring perpetrators of international core crimes to justice. In the following
subsection, I assess the possible answers to these questions.
B. Universal Jurisdiction or Local Justice in Syria?
At the time of the writing of this Article, the international community was
not pursuing criminal charges against perpetrators of international core crimes
in Syria.352 But when the conflict is militarily resolved and Syrian society
reconstructs itself, this situation may change. The ICC will likely be prevented
from intervening because it will not have jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione
personae, and the U.N. Security Council will also likely be paralyzed by
Chinese and Russian vetoes.
However, universal jurisdiction may be applied by foreign national courts
under the following conditions. First, when the conflict ends with the victory
of one or more of the fighting armies, organizations, or militias, persons who
belong to the defeated force or forces may flee Syria. Some of these may be
349

AJAMI, supra note 2, at 124.
Ismail, supra note 2, at 540.
351 Id. at 545.
352 As noted above, an initiative to pass the situation to the ICC failed because of the Chinese and Russian
vetoes in the U.N. Security Council. Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to ICC, BBC NEWS (May
22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27514256.
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perpetrators of international core crimes such as torture or war crimes.
Therefore, the states that are parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions353 and the
Convention Against Torture354 will have to obey their obligations according to
these conventions to either prosecute or extradite those persons.355
Second, internal post-conflict rebuilding of Syrian society, including
processes of reforms and changes, will affect the measures taken by the
international community regarding criminal procedures. The military
resolution of the conflict in Syria will undoubtedly be insufficient to rebuild
and restore Syria as a state in terms of either the cohesion of its civil society or
its functioning as a political entity among the states of the international
community. To achieve these goals, Syrian society will likely have to undergo
a process of transitional justice, in the course of which the outcomes of the
painful conflict can be processed in several ways.356 Syrian society may turn to
reconciliation mechanisms such as truth commissions357 or to local
idiosyncratic procedures of justice, such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda.358 It
may otherwise decide to pursue criminal procedures against perpetrators of
international core crimes. Or it can follow both trajectories—that is, apply both
reconciliation and criminal justice procedures.
If the new post-conflict regime in Syria decides to pursue criminal
procedures, it may apply Syria’s obligations under the Convention Against
Torture or the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and either prosecute or extradite
persons responsible for the crimes of torture and war crimes. It may also use its
own criminal system to pursue criminal charges against perpetrators of other
353

Geneva Convention III, supra note 98.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 100.
355 See Geneva Conventions I–IV, supra note 98.
356 In the last decade there has been extensive writing on transitional justice. See, e.g., Oskar N.T. Thoms
et al., State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?, 4 INT. J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 329
(2010); Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theison, Transitional Justice in Times of Conflict: Colombia’s Ley de
Justicia y Paz, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 49 (2006-2007); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006); RUTI G. TEITEL,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
357 For a discussion of the process of truth commissions and examples of such processes throughout the
world, see, for example, PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
CHALLENGE OF TRUTH (2d ed., 2010); TERESA GODWIN PHELPS, SHATTERED VOICES: LANGUAGE, VIOLENCE,
AND THE WORK OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2004); Susan Kemp, The Inter-Relatioship Between Guatemalan
Commission for Historical Clarification and the Search for Justice in National Courts, 15 CRIM. L. FORUM 67,
67–72 (2004).
358 See, e.g., PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN
RWANDA: JUSTICE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2010); Tully L. Danielle, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca
Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385 (2003).
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international core crimes. Under such circumstances, foreign national courts
willing to apply their universal jurisdiction laws will have to examine whether
the terms of the subsidiarity principle are fulfilled. This examination will
determine whether those states should apply their jurisdiction or waive it. In
the following analysis of the parameters of subsidiarity, I assess post-conflict
Syria’s willingness and ability to pursue criminal procedures against
perpetrators of international core crimes.
The key parameter for such assessment is the independence of the judicial
system.359 The minimum standards for judicial independence include a judicial
system that is impartial,360 and impartiality is one of the indicators of a
willingness to pursue criminal procedures in good faith.361 In addition, an
independent judicial system is viewed as not experiencing a substantial or total
collapse of its institutions and therefore able to undertake prosecutions.362
Applying these parameters of willingness and ability on the post-conflict
judicial system in Syria reveals that Syria will not be independent, and hence
will neither be able nor willing to perform criminal investigations and
prosecutions. As discussed above, the inability of a state to pursue criminal
procedures suggests a substantial collapse and unavailability of the judicial
system.363 This is most apparently the case for judicial systems of “states
emerging from conflict, in which infrastructure and resources have been
destroyed or are unavailable.”364 It is also the case for: “1. [s]tates entangled in
conflict- either domestic or international, 2. [s]tates experiencing political
unrest or economic crisis, [and] States in transition.”365 In these situations, the
judicial and other bureaucratic systems of the state may suffer a shock that
would render them ineffective. Furthermore, violations of rights and disrespect
for the rule of law may threaten the independence of the judicial system.
Finally, procedures of reform and transition to new governments may render
the judicial system unavailable and therefore unable to carry out criminal
procedures against the perpetrators of international core crimes.366 All of these
descriptions match the current conflict in Syria and indicate that Syria would
most likely be unable to carry out criminal proceedings.
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366

Ellis, supra note 144, at 237.
Id.
Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2)(c).
Ellis, supra note 144, at 238.
Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(3).
Ellis, supra note 144, at 237.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 238–39.
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In addition, even when the judicial system in Syria overcomes the legal and
bureaucratic chaos created by the conflict, there still remains the question of its
willingness to perform criminal procedures in good faith. The sectarian trends
that have characterized Syria since its establishment and which also laid the
foundation for the current conflict, although denied by some leading figures of
the opposition,367 may jeopardize the new regime’s ability to conduct genuine
criminal procedures. It will be difficult to secure the rights of defendants that
are not influenced by resentment against one sect or another, especially when
members of some of the sects are responsible for the grievous outcomes of war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
Indeed, the level of implementation of international standards of human
rights is another factor that will have a crucial impact on the independence of
Syria’s judicial system and, as a consequence, on Syria’s ability and
willingness to pursue criminal proceedings. As some scholars suggest, the
application of international standards of human rights is part of the due process
of law.368 Therefore, the unavailability of a state’s judicial system also covers
its lack of implementation of international standards on procedural
requirements.369 This is because in such cases the national judicial system will
not be able “to provide justice in the case.”370
It is, therefore, obvious that judicial systems of states such as monarchies
and dictatorships that ignore the basic principles that are fundamental to the
rule of law371 render their systems unavailable with regard to pursuing criminal
procedures against perpetrators of international core crimes.372 According to
the analysis suggested below, the Syrian legal system currently suffers from
such deficiencies, and is likely to continue to do so when the conflict ends.373

367

See Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2; Ismail, supra note 2, at 540–41, 543.
KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 157. On the duty of states applying universal jurisdiction to comply with
internationally recognized fair trial standards, see Kreβ, supra note 16, at 581–84.
369 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 157.
370 See id.
371 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 144, at 238–69; Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 67.
372 Ellis, supra note 144, at 239.
373 For examples of the Syrian judicial system’s poor respect for international human rights standards, see
generally DAMASCUS CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES, ALTERNATIVE REPORT TO THE SYRIAN
GOVERNMENT’S INITIAL REPORT ON MEASURES TO FULFILL ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (2010),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/SYR/INT_CAT_NGO_SYR_48_10106_E.pdf
; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAR FROM JUSTICE: SYRIA’S SUPREME STATE SECURITY COURT (2009), http://www.
hrw.org/reports/2009/02/23/far-justice-0 [hereinafter FAR FROM JUSTICE].
368
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Due to the Syrian Republic’s establishment through the French Mandate,
French law has had crucial influence over Syria’s legal system, including
criminal law.374 Nevertheless, and even though the Shari’a (i.e., Islamic law) is
not the formal law in Syria,375 Shari’a is stated in the constitution as a major
source of law in Syria.376 This system remained in force after the Ba’ath party
coup of 1963 that turned Syria into a secular unitary republic.377 In 2012, Syria
adopted a constitution that made it a semi-presidential republic.378
However, in practice, the Syrian authoritarian regime’s379 commitment to
basic international legal standards of due process of law and fundamental
human rights is very limited.380 Syria was one of the Arab states that affirmed
the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights in the U.N. General
Assembly381 and is a member of the 1966 Covenants on Human Rights.382
Nevertheless, the Syrian Constitution makes treaty law binding domestically in
Syria “only when new legislation to that effect is promulgated,”383 and
subsequent statutes prevail over treaties in cases of conflict of laws.384 In
addition, in practice, and as a consequence of the mukharabat state established
by the al-Assads,385 several fundamental human rights are very poorly
observed in Syria. For example, the rights of prisoners are not strictly
respected,386 military courts are employed to suppress dissent,387 and even
374

Jacques el-Hakim, Syria, 1 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 142, 152 (1994).
An exception is the application of Muslim law to govern the Muslim community in matters of family
law and succession. See id. at 148.
376 Article 3 of the Syrian Constitution determines that “Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of
legislation.” This Article was maintained in the revised Syrian Constitution of 2012. CONSTITUTION OF THE
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Feb. 26, 2012, art. 3.
377 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96.
378 See CONSTITUTION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, supra note 376.
379 See Reinoud Leenders, Authoritarianism and the Judiciary in Syria: Regime Resilience and
Implications for Judicial Reform Assistance, at 13 (Knowledge Programme Civil Soc’y in W. Asia, Working
Paper No. 17, 2010); Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96.
See generally Annette Büchs, The Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in Syria Under Hafez and Bashar Al-Assad
(Ger. Inst. of Glob. and Area Studies (GIGA), Working Paper No. 97, 2009).
380 See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
381 Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS.
Q. 202, 216 (1990).
382 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
383 Arzt, supra note 381, at 221.
384 Id. at 222.
385 See Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280 and accompanying text.
386 AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2014/2015: SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (2015); FAR
FROM JUSTICE, supra note 373, at 12–13.
387 Arzt, supra note 381, at 226.
375
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though the constitution determines the independence of the judiciary, scholars
have observed the opposite to be true.388 It should also be mentioned that Syria
does not object to capital punishment, as this kind of punishment is not
proscribed by Shari’a.389 This fact alone, however, would not render the Syrian
legal system unable to provide justice in a case. Despite the facts that the Rome
Statute does not include capital punishment390 and that international human
rights law tends to prescribe its abolition,391 this type of punishment is not
formally proscribed by international human rights law. Therefore, the meting
out of capital punishment to perpetrators of international core crimes would not
necessarily evoke the parameters of unwillingness and inability.392
Truly, the opposition’s vision of the future Syrian state is of a civil
democratic state with prominence for human rights. However, the questions
are, first, whether the civic forces including human rights activists and forums
that initiated the uprising will have the upper hand at the end of the conflict,
and second, whether they will be able to realize their plans given the
underlying preconditions of the post-conflict state and society. If they fail in
388
389

2001).

Id. at 206–07; Leenders, supra note 379, at 7.
William A. Schabas, Islam and the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 231–34 (2000-

390 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 77 (determining that “the Court may impose one of the following
penalties on a person convicted of a crime under Article 5 of [the] Statute: (a) Imprisonment for a specified
number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or (b) A term of life imprisonment when
justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”)
391 See, e.g., The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 15, 1989; The Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June
8, 1990; Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty as Amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11,1994, E.T.S.155; Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Jan.
9, 2003; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth Session, 1992), Compilation
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 30 (1994).
392 Note, for example, that when capital punishment was meted out to Saddam Hussein by the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, supported the court’s decision and stated that “the
issue of capital punishment is for each and every Member State to decide.” See Ban Ki-Moon Takes Over as
UN Secretary-General, Calls for Common Action to Face Crises, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Jan. 2, 2007), http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21137#.VAsNqD_lp9A. For an English summary of the Appeals Court’s
decision, see RAID AL-SAEDI, SUMMARY OF THE VERDICT OF 1991 CASE (2010), http://law.case.edu/
Academics/AcademicCenters/Cox/GrotianMomentBlog/documents/1991IHTverdict.pdf. Nevertheless, the
fairness of the trial’s proceedings, including the legality of the punishment inflicted upon Hussein according to
international law, was criticized by other jurists and scholars. See, e.g., SONYA SCEATS, THE TRIAL OF
SADDAM
HUSSEIN
(2005),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/
International%20Law/bptrialhussein.pdf. Sceats mentions that “because of the death penalty, European
investigators have reportedly refused to contribute to mass grave excavations and a number of states have
declined to commit funds to the Court.” Id.
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realizing their vision, then it is more likely that Syria will be considered
unwilling and unable to perform genuine criminal proceedings against the
perpetrators of international core crimes. Foreign national courts of states that
legislated universal jurisdiction laws, such as those described in Part III of this
Article, will have legal authorization to apply these laws.
CONCLUSION
More than a decade after the Princeton Principles and almost a decade after
the Institut de Droit International resolution on universal jurisdiction, this
concept has been and still serves as a prominent tool for the international
community to prevent impunity from the perpetrators of international core
crimes. In this Article, I examined the development of the concept of universal
jurisdiction in order to assess its application to the post-Syrian civil war case.
My analysis supports the concept of universal jurisdiction and its crucial
role in preventing impunity and securing justice. However, because universal
jurisdiction in its absolute version jeopardizes the interests of societies in
transition (such as their ability to reconstruct themselves on foundations that
secure justice for their members), I argued that the concept of mitigated
universal jurisdiction, expressed through the complementarity principle (also
referred to as subsidiarity), can bypass this obstacle in a way that both secures
the values of preventing impunity and strengthens societies in transition,
struggling for their political and legal independence. I discussed the
cornerstone parameters of this principle, i.e., “willingness and ability,” delving
into interpretations of scholars and of the ICC’s jurisdiction, and showed how
this principle was incorporated both by the Rome Statute and by states that
enacted universal jurisdiction laws.
However, I argued that because the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited by various
legal preconditions, it cannot always interfere to achieve global justice. After
discussing the circumstances under which the ICC is unable to apply its
jurisdiction, I suggested that in those situations, states that enact universal
jurisdiction laws could take the ICC’s place. I showed that, like the ICC, those
states also limited their universal jurisdiction laws through the principle of
subsidiarity, and I illustrated the application of this principle in both the
legislation and courts’ decisions in several prominent European states that have
enacted and applied universal jurisdiction laws in several cases.
Lastly, I examined the implications of the above conclusions to the Syrian
case. Basing my analysis on a historical description of the establishment of the
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Syrian state, the construction of Syrian society, and the development of the
Syrian uprising (including a discussion of the motivations of its generators), I
suggested that even though the Syrian society may be willing to conduct
genuine criminal proceedings for the investigation and prosecution of the
perpetrators of international core crimes, it will likely face conspicuous
difficulties in performing this mission. I contended that the post-conflict Syrian
legal system will most likely not be considered independent and hence will not
be “willing and able” to conduct criminal procedures. Therefore, the
international community will have room to apply universal jurisdiction after
considering the parameters of complementarity—the willingness and ability of
Syria to conduct those procedures by itself—and reaching the conclusion that
the Syrian society does not live up to those parameters.
The above notwithstanding, in practice, there is still doubt whether foreign
national courts will realize their legal rights to adjudicate the perpetrators of
international core crimes in Syria. International relations and political
considerations may influence states’ decisions; hence, some states, desiring to
preserve good relations with the new Syrian state, may abstain from meddling
in Syria’s internal affairs,393 at least where Syria’s legal actions are in “a grey
area” and especially if the international community is willing to tolerate the
imperfect application of the rule of law in a state coming out of the turmoil of a
revolution.394 While it is therefore impossible to predict how states will choose
to apply the legal tool of universal jurisdiction they have developed and
endorsed, it is nevertheless important to note the legality of its application. It is
to be hoped that—at least in evident cases where impunity should be prevented
and the rights and interests of victims should be secured—states will choose to
apply universal jurisdiction laws to adjudicate perpetrators of international core
crimes in Syria.

393

at 2–5.

For similar considerations to avoid the application of universal jurisdiction, see Langer, supra note 28,

394 See Lama Abu Odeh, On Law and Revolution, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 341, 344–45 (2013) (discussing
the application of the rule of law in post-revolution Egypt). Cf. Cases and Situation: Libya, COAL. FOR INT’L
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=libya (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (noting that the ICC exerted
its jurisdiction over al-Gaddafi and claimed that Libya was unable to conduct a genuine investigation and
prosecution). However, there is no guarantee that, if the case had been examined by states instead of the ICC,
political considerations such as the ones discussed above would not have tilted the balance against applying
universal jurisdiction.

